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COMMENT
Credit Derivatives: Industry Initiative
Supplants Need for Direct Regulatory




This Comment will focus on the developments in the
credit derivatives market in 2005-2006, focusing specifically
on the private sector initiative, which addressed problems
that had developed in this evolving market during its
tremendous growth in recent years. The success of this
initiative was a significant accomplishment, not just for the
quick and efficient progress made, but because the market
was able to self-correct its own industry-wide problems,
thereby avoiding the need for direct intervention into the
market by an outside regulatory authority.
This initiative will then be discussed, in the context of
recent concern over the waning of U.S. financial markets'
competitiveness due to perceived regulatory inefficiency, as
a model for a proposed regulatory framework that shifts
t J.D. Candidate, University at Buffalo Law School, 2008. I would like to thank
Professor Halpern for suggesting that I look at issues in derivatives markets for
my Law Review Comment, and the members of the Buffalo Law Review for
their editorial assistance. I also wish to thank my wife for her patience and my
father for his advice while I was researching and writing this Comment.
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more authority to markets to self-regulate under the
oversight of a consolidated single governmental regulator
for all financial markets.
Part I will briefly introduce financial derivatives, and
attempt to give the reader a sense of their growing
importance in the financial world. Part II will examine the
current state of regulation in the derivatives markets. Part
III will then explore the credit derivatives market in more
detail, orienting the reader to the role of credit derivatives
and discussing some basic types and variations of these
instruments. Part IV will discuss in detail the recent
developments in the credit derivatives markets, and the
industry initiative that was able to self-correct the major
problems facing that market.
Part V will look at some of the recent concerns for the
waning of U.S. competitiveness in the financial markets,
focusing on the perceived deficiencies in the current
regulatory structure. Finally, Part VI will propose a model
for a new regulatory framework derived from the initiative
used in the credit derivatives market, where the market
participants were allowed to address the problems within
the market through collaborative effort instigated by joint
regulatory concern. This market participant initiative will
then be discussed as part of a proposed regulatory structure,
where substantial rulemaking authority is shifted to
similar initiatives that are guided and enforced by a single
governmental regulator which oversees all financial
markets through a set of guiding principles.
I. DERIVATIVES, IN GENERAL 1
A. Derivatives Explained
In the financial context, derivatives are instruments
whose value is measured by reference to an underlying
contract or asset.2 They "derive" their value from the value
1. This Comment assumes some knowledge of derivative financial
instruments, and therefore, some of the terminology in that market will not be
defined. For a comprehensive introduction to derivatives, see MICHAEL DURBIN,
ALL ABOUT DERIVATIVES (2006).
2. "A derivatives transaction is a contract whose value depends on (or
'derives' from) the value of an underlying asset, reference rate, or index." GROUP
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of an external thing. Another way to look at derivatives is
as a form of price guarantee: an agreement between a
future buyer and a future seller for something at some
designated point in time.3 "They allow investors to place
bets on the direction of markets, without ever needing
actually to own tangible assets in that market."4 Because of
the increasing complexity of variations and innovations in
the types and arrangement of derivatives contracts, any
more generalized definition is not possible. 5
Derivatives are not a current invention, 6 but they are
becoming increasingly important in the way that the
financial world operates. Derivatives are employed as a way
to hedge other positions, to speculate, and as a means of
arbitrage. Their versatility is one of their most intriguing
and important characteristics.7
OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES & PRINCIPLES 2 (July 1993). "Underlyings
can be anything that interests markets: cash instruments, like stocks and
bonds; tangibles, like commodities; or intangibles, like interest rates, currency
rates, stock market indices and credit quality." Norman Menachem Feder,
Deconstructing Over-The-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 677,
681.
3. DURBIN, supra note 1, at 1.
4. A User's Guide to Derivatives, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 18, 2006, at 19
(giving a quick snapshot of the various derivatives markets, including interest
rate derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives, credit derivatives, equity
derivatives, and commodity derivatives).
5. See Feder, supra note 2, at 681 ("Derivatives ... are hard to define
because they vary widely in content and application."); cf. Saul S. Cohen, The
Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1993, 1994 (1995) (stating that
derivatives are constantly evolving).
6. For a history of derivatives, going back to 2000 B.C., and the development
of derivatives in the U.S., see Jerry W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds,"
"General Custer," and the Regulation of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25
SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1994).
7. It should be noted that not all financial professionals embrace
derivatives. See, e.g., Letter from Warren Buffet, Chairman, Berkshire
Hathaway, Inc., to Shareholders, at 15 (Feb. 21, 2003), available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf ("[D]erivatives are
financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent,
are potentially lethal."). But see, recently, Letter from Warren Buffet,
Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to Shareholders, at 17 (Feb. 28, 2007),
available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/20061tr.pdf:
I should mention that all of the direct currency profits we have realized
have come from forward contracts, which are derivatives, and that we
have entered into other types of derivatives contracts as well .... Why,
you may wonder, are we fooling around with such potentially toxic
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Arbitrage is the strategy of searching for mistakes or
discrepancies in pricing across markets and then exploiting
those discrepancies by simultaneously buying at one price
and selling at another, and profiting from the spread.
Hedging is the practice of taking an offsetting position
in one investment to counteract the risk that has been
taken in another investment position. This is one of the
most significant functions of derivatives: their usefulness
and efficiency in allowing parties to allocate risk. Hedging
allows a party to take on a "risky" investment opportunity
and then re-allocate some or all of that risk to another
party, thereby giving up some of the potential return on the
initial investment, but at the same time limiting the risk
that the initial investment will pose.8
Derivatives allow a speculator to take a position based
on how he thinks a market will move, but without having to
purchase outright the instruments or assets that make up
that market. 9 Speculating and hedging with derivatives
material? The answer is that derivatives, just like stocks and bonds,
are sometimes wildly mispriced. For many years, accordingly, we have
selectively written derivative contracts-few in number but sometimes
for large dollar amounts. We currently have 62 contracts outstanding. I
manage them personally, and they are free of counterparty credit risk.
So far, these derivative contracts have worked out well for us,
producing pre-tax profits in the hundreds of millions of dollars (above
and beyond the gains I've itemized from forward foreign-exchange
contracts). Though we will experience losses from time to time, we are
likely to continue to earn-overall-significant profits from mispriced
derivatives.
8. It is important to remember that derivatives do not eliminate the risk of
the initial investment, they just reposition it, i.e., lay it off onto another party,
allowing the risk to be spread out and reducing each party's exposure to a level
that they are comfortable undertaking. See Feder, supra note 2, at 683
("[D]erivatives do not eliminate underlying risk; they only reposition it.").
9. For example, if an investor believed that stock of company XYZ was going
to go up in value over the next year, he could either (1) buy the stock and hold it
for a year until it appreciated in value; (2) enter into a forward contract for that
stock, whereby he agrees to buy some amount of the stock in one year at some
designated price (presumably less than he thinks it is going be at that time); (3)
if that stock is traded on a futures exchange, enter into a futures contract for
that stock (the primary differences between a futures contract and a forward
contract is that the futures contract is standardized and set up at established
amounts and intervals, and the transaction takes place on an exchange rather
than being negotiated bilaterally); or (4) enter into a long options contract,
whereby in exchange for paying a premium, he has the option of buying some
amount of that stock at some designated price at some specified time in the
future (options are traded on exchanges and bilaterally). These methods are all
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both employ the power of leverage, allowing a party to take
positions that "focus 'financial energy' so hedgers and
speculators can get more work done with less effort,"10 i.e.,
make more efficient use of their money by tying up less
money in each position.
B. Derivatives Markets"
Derivatives can be divided into two broad categories:
exchange-traded and over-the-counter (OTC). The
exchange-traded market tends to have more standardized
contracts, and takes place on a central platform where
parties act through an intermediary, called a market-
maker. The parties do not interact with each other, but
rather enter into preestablished contracts with the market-
maker who acts as the counterparty both to the buyer and
the seller. The exchange-traded market primarily consists
of two groups: futures 12 and options.
13
The OTC market 14 for derivatives consists of parties
entering into contracts directly with each other, where they
have the ability to formulate transactions that are exactly
tailored to their respective needs. This allows for much
more innovation and variation, because the parties can
negotiate the specific details of the deal directly with each
speculating, but the latter three choices employ simple derivatives to achieve
the same result as choice (1) without having to own the stock, thereby
leveraging a smaller amount of outlay to achieve the same results.
10. DURBIN, supra note 1, at 5.
11, In this section, estimates for the notional amounts outstanding in the
exchange-traded and over-the-counter markets are given. However, it should be
noted that estimating notional amounts of the markets overstates the risk
exposure of the markets since parties hedge positions by taking offsetting
positions in other transactions, thereby increasing the notional value of the
market, but reducing the market's true exposure to risk.
12. The latest report from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
estimates that the total global outstanding notional principal amount of
exchange-traded futures is almost $31.7 trillion. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENT,
QUARTERLY REVIEW, at A 108 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.bis.org/publl
qtrpdf/r-qa0709.pdf.
13. The BIS estimates the total global outstanding notional principal
amount of exchange-traded options is almost $65 trillion. Id.
14. The BIS estimates the total OTC notional amounts outstanding as




other. The OTC market consists of many variations on
these types of basic derivative contracts: forwards, options,
and swaps. The OTC derivative market is divided into five
major categories: foreign currency exchange contracts,
interest rate contracts, equity-linked contracts, commodity
contracts, and credit derivatives.
II. REGULATION OF DERIVATIVES
The present state of derivatives regulation is governed
primarily by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000 (CFMA), 15 which amended the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA).16 The CEA was enacted in the mid-1930s,
contemporaneous with the laws governing securities
regulation. 17 Regulation of futures was separate from the
securities laws because of the strong agricultural influence
in Congress.' 8 The primary use of futures in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries was to ensure stable crop
prices by allowing farmers and dealers to enter into pricing
contracts that were not subject to the high degree of
seasonal volatility that had plagued the agricultural
markets.' 9 The CEA did not envision the over-the-counter
markets for derivatives; 20 in fact, it required all futures
15. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
16. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
17. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(aa) (2000); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(o) (2000). The other laws governing the
regulation of the securities markets grew out of these laws. See, e.g., Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)(1)-(64) (2000); Investment Advisors Act
of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)(1)-(21) (2000).
18. See Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of
Securities and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom
and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 319, 338-40 (2003).
19. Prices would skyrocket during the off-season, when the supply of crops
was low, but then those prices would plummet after the crops were harvested
when the market was flooded with that year's supply. See WILLIAM CRONON,
NATURE'S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST 123-25 (1991). Forwards
and futures developed to stabilize these prices for commodities like crops. See
CHICAGO BD. OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRAINING MANUAL 3-4 (1982).
20. In fact, the enforceability of OTC derivative transactions and swaps was
not even certain until the Futures Trading Practices Act (FTPA) of 1992, which
amended the Commodity Exchange Act. Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590. In
the FTPA, Congress provided that transactions by certain "appropriate persons"
1376 [Vol. 55
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contracts to be traded on a "contract market," such as the
Chicago Board of Trade.
21
In 1974, Congress amended the CEA with the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act (CFTCA),
22
creating a regulatory oversight commission for the futures
markets that was similar to the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC). Although the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) and SEC struggled over
jurisdiction, especially concerning "hybrid" instruments,
23 it
was the CFTC that made the move to create a more
harmonized regulatory framework for derivative
instruments. 24 The regulations proposed by the CFTC
became the basis for the regulatory framework in the
CFMA. Thereafter, the CFTC adopted a revised set of
regulations to implement the CFMA.
25
(e.g., institutional traders) could be exempt from the exchange trading
requirement of the CEA. For a discussion of the exemptive provisions of the
FTPA, see Markham, supra note 6, at 22.
21. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6, 6h. For a discussion of the problems created by
creating an exchange market monopoly, see Jerry W. Markham, The
Commodity Exchange Monopoly-Reform is Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
977 (1991).
22. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).
23. Hybrid instruments contained elements of futures, options and
securities, thus sparking jurisdictional confusion as to who should be able to
regulate this market: the SEC or CFTC. For a discussion of these jurisdictional
problems, see Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments Under the
Commodity Exchange Act: A Call for Alternatives, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1
(1990). Further compounding the problem of CFTC regulatory jurisdiction was
the Treasury Amendment to the CEA, which stated that the CEA did not
govern or apply to an agreement, contract, or transaction in foreign currency;
security warrants, security rights, re-sales of installment loan contracts, re-
purchase options, government securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase
commitments, unless such transactions involve the sales thereof for future
delivery conducted on an organized exchange. 7 U.S.C. § 2(c) (2000). For a
discussion of the jurisdictional and interpretative difficulties surrounding the
Treasury amendment, see Markham, supra note 6, at 17-21.
24. The CFTC proposed regulations that were the prelude to the regulatory
framework that Congress adopted in the CFMA, which included exempting
swap transactions and creating a tiered regulatory framework. See A New
Regulatory Framework for Multilateral Transaction Execution Facilities,
Intermediaries and Clearing, 65 Fed. Reg. 77962 (Dec. 13, 2000) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1,5,15,36-38,100,170,180); see also JERRY W. MLARKHAM, 13A
COMMODITIES REG. § 27:12:1 (2002).
25. A New Regulatory Framework for Multilateral Transaction Execution
Facilities, Intermediaries and Clearing, 66 Fed. Reg. 42256 (Aug. 10, 2001) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1,5,15,36-38,40,41,100,170,180).
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Congress enacted the CFMA, 26 inter alia, with these
purposes in mind:
(6) to promote innovation for futures and derivatives and to reduce
systemic risk by enhancing legal certainty in the markets for
certain futures and derivatives transactions;
(7) to reduce systemic risk and provide greater stability to markets
during times of market disorder by allowing the clearing of
transactions in over-the-counter derivatives through appropriately
regulated clearing organizations; and
(8) to enhance the competitive position of United States financial
institutions and financial markets.
2 7
With those guiding purposes in mind, they sought to
create a regulatory framework that would allow the
innovation of OTC derivative instruments to flourish and
not be stifled by excessive regulation that was unnecessary
for the sophisticated parties participating in those
transactions.
The three themes of flexibility, legal certainty, and
shared regulatory coordination run throughout the
CFMA. 28 The CFMA had two important consequences for
derivatives markets: first, it clarified that certain OTC
derivative transactions were outside the jurisdiction of the
CFTC; and second, it allowed the trading of single-stock
futures and futures on narrowly-based stock indices (under
joint jurisdiction of the SEC and CFTC). 29
The CFMA excludes OTC derivative transactions from
26. The 2000 CFMA established a set of "core principles" that contract
markets would have to abide; it was meant to open up competition by
eliminating prescriptive rules. CFTC Reauthorization to Dominate 200: Security
Futures, Energy Likely Topics, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 72 (Jan.
10, 2005). "Other highlights of the act were the establishment of security
futures products and a unique regulatory structure to oversee them, the
assurance of legal certainty for derivatives products and a sliding scale of
oversight for contract markets that depended on the level of sophistication of
the participants." Id.
27. CFMA § 2 (Purposes of CFMA).
28. Walt Lukken, CFTC Comm'r, Address at the ISDA Energy, Commodities
and Developing Products Conference: The Derivatives World is Flat (June 14,
2006), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches06/opalukken-20.htm.
29. See Dean Kloner, The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 29
SEC. REG. L. J. 286, 286 (2001) (explaining the key provisions of the CFMA that
apply to the derivatives markets).
1378 [Vol. 55
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regulation as long as the parties are Eligible Contract
Participants that are negotiating bilateral contracts for
excluded or exempt commodities. 30 The CFMA also provides
legal certainty for swap agreements,3 1 and specifically
states that nothing in the CEA shall apply to "certain swap
agreements (including credit and equity swaps), hybrid
instruments and other products commonly offered by
banks. ' 32 Also, the CFMA provides that futures on single
stocks and narrowly based indices are now allowed under
joint jurisdiction of the SEC and CFTC. 3 The CFTC
remained as the sole regulator of commodity exchanges,
having a monopoly over markets in which small traders
were allowed to participate in futures and options.
34
The effect of these provisions was to provide certainty
to OTC derivative transactions and remove them from any
regulatory interference as long as "eligible" parties to such
contracts abided by the rules in the CFMA. "Market share
gradually slipped away to the over-the-counter derivatives
markets" because the lack of regulation allowed the OTC
market to develop quickly through innovation while the
exchange-traded market was stifled by persistent
adherence to custom and remained rooted in traditional
derivative instruments. 35
30. Eligible Contract Participants broadly means that the party must be a
large sophisticated institution or a wealthy individual. For a detailed
explanation of Eligible Contract Participant, see CFMA, section 101
(Definitions). Excluded commodities are interest rates, exchange rates,
currencies, securities, securities indices, credit risks and measures such as
inflation and other indices based solely on commodities that have no cash
market or on prices or values not within the control of any party to the
transaction. Exempt commodities are all commodities that are not "excluded"
and not agricultural commodities, such as metals and energy products. See
Markham, supra note 23.
31. See CFMA, Title III.
32. Kloner, supra note 29, at 287.
33. Single stock futures had been prohibited under the Shad-Johnson
Accords, an agreement between the SEC and CFTC made in 1982, and later
codified by Congress, during the jurisdictional disputes between the two
commissions. Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 stat. 1409 (1982). For a discussion of the
Shad-Johnson Accords, see Don L. Horwitz & Jerry W. Markham, Sunset on the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Scene II, 39 Bus. LAw. 67, 72-76
(1983).
34. See Markham, supra note 24, at § 28:3.
35. Id. The Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
were once the predominant exchanges for futures, but the Eurex exchange and
2008] 1379
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There has been tremendous freedom given to the OTC
derivative markets, as one report has noted:
It is commonly said that the market in over-the-counter
derivatives is unregulated. Compared to the exchange-period
derivative market, this is true. The futures and options exchanges
operate under the scrutiny of a regulatory agency-the CFTC and
the SEC-with broad authority to monitor transactions, to require
registration and financial disclosure of market position, to
establish and enforce rules of conduct and financial standards, and
to intervene directly in the marketplace, if need be, to maintain
fair and orderly trading. There is no such overarching regulatory
structure in the over-the-counter market.
3 6
This freedom has allowed the OTC derivative market to
evolve without strictures.3 7 In a recent report on credit
derivatives, the Government Accountability Office noted:
Because OTC credit derivatives transactions [or any OTC
derivative transaction, for that matter] occur between private
parties and are not traded on regulated exchanges, they are not
subject to regulation in the United States, provided that the
parties and other aspects of the transaction satisfy requirements
of the Commodity Exchange . ... Although the OTC credit
derivatives products themselves are not regulated, certain market
participants are. If the dealer is a U.S. bank federally chartered as
a national bank, it is supervised by the OCC [Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency]. If a bank is owned by a bank holding
even newer exchanges like the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) were able to
undercut the American markets by adopting electronic trading while the CBOT
and CME remained steadfastly tied to the trading floors. "Like the American
car manufacturers in the 1970s, the exchanges and their members saw their
volume being eroded by more nimble competitors, but refused to compete,
preferring shelter in their dwindling market share to the risks of competition."
Id.
36. Markham, supra note 6, at 2 n. 6 (citing CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMM. & FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY &
COMMERCE, 103D CONG., REP. ON DERIVATIVE FIN. MKTS. 13-17 (Comm. Print
1993)).
37. It is important to note that the OTC derivatives market is not un-
regulated, but rather, "[o]ne of the major reasons behind the exclusion of OTC
derivatives from [the CFTC's] jurisdiction was the fact that other Federal
regulators were already overseeing many of the entities trading these
products." Lukken, supra note 28. The sophisticated institutions that deal in
OTC derivatives are large banks and firms that are regulated by the Federal
Reserve Bank, the SEC and other regulatory agencies; it is only the OTC
derivative transactions themselves that do not have a separate regulatory
agency.
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company, its holding company is regulated by the Federal Reserve.
These bank regulators oversee these entities to ensure the safety
and soundness of the banking system and the stability of the
financial markets. If the credit derivatives dealer is a securities
broker-dealer, it is overseen by SEC. According to U.S. regulators,
some of the U.S. banks and securities broker-dealers also conduct
credit derivatives trades in foreign affiliates subject to foreign
regulation. Similarly, other participants in the credit derivatives
market include foreign banks that are supervised by foreign
regulators and, in some cases, also by U.S. regulators if operating
in the United States.
38
In the OTC markets, new instruments and products are
freely developed to accommodate the varied needs of parties
seeking to reduce their exposure to risk, as well as, to make
the most efficient use of their resources through the
leverage employed by derivative instruments.
One corner of the OTC derivative market has been
growing at an astounding rate, and while there have been
some bumps in the road, the industry has come together
under the watchful eye of regulators to make tremendous
strides in solving the problems that such growth has
engendered: the credit derivatives market.
III. CREDIT DERIVATIVES
A. The Credit Derivatives Market
The credit derivatives market has grown exponentially
over the last five years. It has been called "the fastest
growing financial market there is. '' 39 According to the ISDA
38. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: CONFIRMATION
BACKLOGS INCREASED DEALERS' OPERATIONAL RISK, BUT WERE SUCCESSFULLY
ADDRESSED AFTER JOINT REGULATORY ACTION, 10-11 (June 2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07716.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. The GAO
was asked by Congress to review the causes of the confirmation backlogs and
the steps U.S. financial regulators were taking to address the issue. Id. at 2.
The GAO analyzed credit derivatives market data, conducted interviews of
industry groups, market participants and regulators in Charlotte, N. Carolina;
Chicago; New York; and Washington, D.C. from August 2006 to March 2007. Id.
at 2-3.
39. Jenny Anderson, Calm Before and During a Storm: Derivatives May Put
the New York Fed Chief Through a Stress Test, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at C1
(discussing Federal Reserve Bank of New York president Timothy Geithner,
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Year-End 2006 Market Survey, the notional amount
outstanding of credit default swaps was $34.4 trillion at
year end, a 101% increase for the year, compared to a 103%
increase in 2005.40 The notional amount outstanding of
credit default swaps was only $2.15 trillion at the end of
2002. 4 1 These statistics clearly indicate the phenomenal
growth of the credit derivatives market and its increasing
importance in the financial world.
One may think of credit derivatives as a form of
performance guarantee.42 Credit derivatives, unsurprisingly,
deal with the allocation of credit risk. Credit risk is the risk
a party faces that his counterparty will default on their
obligation to him. 43 Credit derivatives allow a party to
"unbundle" credit risk from the other risks that an
investment carries. 44 Credit derivatives are intended to
reduce risk by spreading that risk out among many
parties.45 The credit protection buyer buys protection from
the protection seller to mitigate, or even eliminate, the risk
that a reference entity will default on its obligation to the
buyer. 46 The protection buyer and seller are free to
determine what will constitute a "credit event" so as to
trigger the obligation of the protection seller to compensate
the protection buyer.47
and the success of the initiative in the credit derivatives market).
40. INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVE ASS'N, INC. 2006 YEAR-END MKT. SURVEY,
http://isda.org (follow "Surveys & Market Statistics" hyperlink; then follow
"Summaries of Market Survey Results" hyperlink). This survey monitors credit
default swaps on single-name references, baskets, and portfolios of credit and
index trades. Credit default swaps make up the overwhelming majority of credit
derivative instrument, see infra note 52. Credit default swaps are discussed and
explained, infra, in the text accompanying notes 52-58.
41. INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVE ASS'N, INC. 2002 YEAR-END MKT. SURVEY,
available at http://isda.org (follow "Surveys & Market Statistics" hyperlink;
then follow "Summaries of Market Survey Results" hyperlink).
42. DURBIN, supra note 1, at 62.
43. Credit derivatives are usually concerned with debt securities,
specifically corporate or sovereign bonds. See id.; Feder, supra note 2, at 707.
44. For a discussion of the other types of risk, including, market, liquidity,
operational, legal and systemic risks, see Feder, supra note 2, at 721-31.
45. Anderson, supra note 39, at C1.
46. As Durbin points out, this begs the question of how you can be sure that
the protection seller will not default. Thus, in reality you have just substituted
one credit risk for another. DURBIN, supra note 1, at 63 n.1.
47. While the parties are free to determine what will constitute a credit
1382 [Vol. 55
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Credit derivatives are primarily used to:
* Reduce risk from ownership of bonds or loans;
* Take exposure to an entity, as one would do by buying a
bond or loan;
* Express a positive or negative credit view on a single
entity or a group of entities, independent of any other
exposures to the entity one might have.
48
The idea of reallocating credit risk, or the risk of
default, is not new; banks have done it for years when they
syndicated loans or took third-party guarantees and letters
of credit. The novel aspect of credit derivatives is that they
allow for a market in credit risk that is completely separated
from the underlying reference obligation, enabling the
market to trade the credit risk separately from the
instrument that creates the risk.49 This allows for much
more than just "default protection;" a speculator, confident
that the reference entity will not default, can collect a
premium as a protection seller, and an arbitrageur or
market-maker can find discrepancies in the markets and
exploit them by selling credit protection to one party and
then buying that same protection from another party at a
lower price, or buying low and selling high, and pocketing
the difference. 50
B. Types of Credit Derivatives
There are many different types of credit derivatives,
and this Comment will only outline a sample to convey the
variety of instruments and their uses.51 First, four of the
event for their transaction, there are five standard credit events defined by the
ISDA: bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation default, obligation acceleration and
restructuring. "Bankruptcy involves seeking court protection against creditors
when a company can't pay its bills, failure to pay is essentially like missing a
payment on a car loan, obligation default is when the lender declares the
borrower in violation of payment terms and demands return of the principal,
obligation acceleration is when the terms of a debt call for immediate payment
of some or all of a debt 'ahead of schedule' as a result of some issue, and
restructuring is a broad event that includes things like debt consolidation." Id.
at 65.
48. CRMPG II REPORT, infra note 87, at app. A-3.
49. Feder, supra note 2, at 707.
50. DURBIN, supra note 1, at 62-63.
51. "The diversity of the range of credit derivatives products continues to
expand and since the first BBA survey was published in 1996, the market has
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basic credit derivatives will be discussed; credit default
swaps, total return swaps, credit linked notes and
collateralized debt obligations. Then, this author will briefly
sketch a few more complex and innovative products being
employed in the market today to orient the reader to the
intricate nature of these products in the current market.
The most prevalent and simplest type of credit
derivative is the credit default swap (CDS).52 A CDS is like
a homeowner's policy-the protection buyer pays a
premium (called a CDS spread) to the protection seller,
whereby the seller will compensate the buyer for any loss
resulting from a "credit event"53 incurred by the reference
entity. The primary buyers of single-name CDSs are
commercial lenders and corporate or sovereign bond
holders, and the primary sellers are insurance companies
and large financial institutions.54
A CDS can reference a single debt security (e.g. a bond)
from a single reference entity, called a single-name CDS, or
it can reference a portfolio of different debt securities from
different reference entities, this is called a portfolio CDS.
Variations on the CDS include the "first or n t h to default,"55
the "CDS option,"56 an index-linked CDS, 57 and a "binary
risen exponentially." Press Release, British Bankers' Ass'n, Credit Derivatives
Market Expected to Reach $33 Trillion by End of 2008 (Sept. 21, 2006) (quoting
Ian Mullen, Chief Executive of the BBA).
52. Some authorities estimate that credit default swaps make up ninety-five
percent of the credit derivatives market. Credit Derivatives Market Swells to
$26 Trillion in Year, Association Says, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at
1590 (Sept. 25, 2006).
53. See supra note 47 for an explanation of common credit events.
54. DURBIN, supra note 1, at 64. Large financial institutions are often also
holders of corporate and sovereign bonds.
55. The "first or nth to default CDS" is a form of portfolio CDS where the
protection seller pays the protection buyer when the "first" or "nth" (depending
on the terms of the contract) reference entity in the portfolio experiences a
credit event. This type of CDS is cheaper than buying a single-name CDS on
each reference entity. See Donald A. Bendernagel, Common Derivatives and
Their Uses: Credit Derivatives, 1559 PLI CORP. 85, 98-101 (2006).
56. In exchange for a premium, the "CDS option" or "Credit Default
Swaption" creates the right to buy or sell a CDS on a reference entity in the
future at a predetermined price. The buyer would enter into a CDS option if it
believes that the cost of a CDS on a reference entity will increase, thereby
enabling the buyer to buy protection at a lower price than the market is trading
for in the future, allowing the buyer to simultaneously sell protection at the
higher market price and pocket the difference (minus the premium paid for the
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CDS."58
Another type of credit derivative is the total return
swap. This allows a protection buyer to "rent out" an asset.
The protection seller pays a stream of regular, usually
fixed, payments in exchange for the protection buyer
transferring all income and capital changes from the
reference asset to the protection seller. The protection seller
takes all losses and gains incurred by the asset, but the
asset remains on the protection buyer's balance sheet. The
main difference between the total return swap and a CDS is
that the protection seller makes payments regardless of the
performance of the reference asset, rather than
compensating the protection buyer for the occurrence of a
credit event by the reference entity.59
Another form of credit derivative is the credit linked
note. In this financial vehicle, the protection seller raises
capital from investors for the express purpose of issuing
credit protection to protection buyers. That capital is held
for the sole purpose of providing compensation to credit
buyers in the event of a credit event by a reference entity. A"special purpose vehicle" (SPV) or "special purpose entity" is
often created to act as the protection seller. The buyer still
pays a premium to the seller, but the seller then pays part
of that premium to the investors for use of their money. A
credit linked note theoretically removes all credit risk for
the credit protection buyer vis a vis the seller, because the
money is being held for the sole purpose of providing credit
option). A seller would take the view that the cost of protection for a reference
entity will decrease, thereby locking in that higher price for the cost of the
premium. See id. at 113.
57. An index linked CDS is an extremely liquid instrument that is like
buying a CDS on each reference entity that composes the index all at once. An
example is the Dow Jones CDX.IG, which is composed of 125 reference entities.
The instrument is so liquid because of the diversity of the entities that compose
the index, which enables the index-linked CDS to be an effective hedge for
many positions. See id. at 112.
58. A "binary CDS" or "digital CDS" is where the protection buyer receives a
specified fixed payment from the protection seller upon the occurrence of a
credit event by the reference entity, rather than the seller compensating the
buyer for the actual loss suffered, or having to pay the buyer par value for the
reference obligation. See DURBIN, supra note 1, at 69; Bendernagel, supra note
55, at 114 (describing fixed recovery swaps).
59. This description of a total return swap is based on the explanation
provided in DURBIN, supra note 1, at 66-68.
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protection; thus, theoretically eliminating the risk of
default by the seller.6 0
Another form of credit derivative is the collateralized
debt obligation (CDO). In general, a special purpose vehicle
(SPV) is created that issues senior, mezzanine, and sub-
(also called equity) debt to raise money to purchase a pool of
financial assets, such as debt instruments (this is a cash
CDO), or a group of credit derivatives (this is a synthetic
CDO), or a mixture of the two (a hybrid CDO). The tranches
(or levels of debt) each have their own risk rating and level
of risk, with the senior tranche having the highest rating
and lowest risk, while the equity tranche has the lowest
rating and highest degree of risk. The equity tranche incurs
all of the losses from the CDO's investments until the
equity tranche is exhausted, and then the next lowest
tranche will incur the losses, and so on up the hierarchy of
tranches. The lower tranches provide a cushion for the
higher tranches, ensuring that the higher tranches will not
suffer any of the losses of an investment until the lower
tranches are exhausted.
The potential return is positively correlated to the risk
exposure of each tranche, with the equity getting the
highest percentage return on their money, while the senior
tranche gets the lowest percentage return. This allows the
CDO to leverage its capital because the senior tranche
typically invests the majority of the money but is only
making a small return, and the lower tranches that are
making a higher return have only invested a relatively
small amount of the CDO's capital (enough for the CDO to
have a comfortable cushion). This allows the CDO to reap a
competitive return on its investments that far exceeds the
return of the senior tranche, and while this return may be
equal to or even lower than the return on the equity
tranche, it is calculated on a much higher notional amount,
thereby outpacing the return due to the lower tranches. The
SPV in the CDO earns the difference in the spread between
what it makes on a return for its investments and the
aggregate amount of returns it has to pay to the various
tranches.6 1
60. Id. at 68-69.
61. This description of CDOs is summary in nature, for a more
comprehensive explanation, see Gary Barnett, Understanding CDOs, 891 PLI
COMMODITIES 769 (2006); Bendernagel, supra note 55, at 102-05.
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Hopefully, this sample of basic credit derivatives
illustrates the dynamic nature of the market. Credit
derivatives offer a variety of ways for parties to custom
tailor financial instruments to allocate risk. These
instruments serve as the basis for a wide variety of
variations on these basic concepts, with new innovations
being introduced all the time.
Some innovations are products such as the target
annual review note (TARN), constant proportion portfolio
insurance (CPPI), and constant proportion debt obligations
(CPDO).6 2 These are complex credit derivatives, and are
briefly summarized here merely to show the innovation of
the market.
In a TARN, capital is invested in a portfolio of positions.
The TARN has a target return rate, the achievement of
which is the goal of the investment. The TARN promises a
100% protected return of capital investment within a fixed
maturity, with an annual coupon based on the worst
performing stock in the selected portfolio. But, if the sum of
all the coupons in the portfolio reaches the predetermined
target return, the TARN is automatically redeemed early.
This investment strategy is based on leverage and
correlation. The more correlated the positions in the
portfolio, the higher the chance of reaching the target
return rate, and the greater the chance of an early
redemption.63
In CPPI, the investor is theoretically protected against
loss, but still able to participate in, and benefit from, gains.
CPPI depends on dynamic (or continuous) allocation
between risky and non-risky positions (such as government
bonds). Capital is allocated to the risky investment as it
gains value, but re-allocated to a non-risky investment
when the risky position is declining. By shifting more and
more money to the non-risky investment during periods of
declining value in the risky positions, this strategy seeks to
preserve a minimum return (usually a guaranteed return of
principal). This strategy depends on high amounts of
62. While the TARN and CPPI investment strategies have been around for a
while, they are becoming more prevalent and more widely applied as
derivatives markets expand the base of positions to which they can be applied.
63. This description is based on the CRMPG II REPORT, infra note 87, at A-
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leverage to take advantage of the gains in the risky position
when it is performing well, as well as constant monitoring
of the fluctuations in the underlying position values to
determine the proper allocation between risky and non-
risky positions.6 4
Another relatively recent innovation in the credit
derivatives market is the CPDO.65 A special purpose vehicle
is created, which issues highly rated bonds (usually AAA for
both principal and coupon) to investors with a coupon rate
of up to LIBOR + 200bp6 6 (in some cases even higher), with
a long maturity date (usually at least 10 years). The SPV
then invests that money in a pool of assets, to be used as
collateral. The return on that pool of assets is then swapped
with a bank in exchange for premiums that the bank pays
as a protection buyer in CDSs on a reference portfolio made
up of credit indices, usually 50% each of the Dow Jones
CDX (Investment Grade) and the iTraxx Europe (IG). These
indices are composed of highly rated, stable companies, and
the indices are rolled (i.e., rebalanced to determine which
companies to include in the index) every six months-this
leads to a relatively low risk of default on the CDSs because
the index is monitoring the credit worthiness of the
companies it lists.
The CPDO starts out highly leveraged (up to 15x) to
build up a cushion between its investment returns (i.e., the
premiums collected as protection sellers in the CDSs) and
its coupon payments. Leverage is then decreased over time
if the investments perform well, or maintained at a high
rate if necessary to make up for any poor performance or
64. This description is based on id. at A-39. See also bfinance, Constant
Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI) 101, http://www.bfinance.co.uk/inst/
article.do?seried=l&docid=Nl2309 (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
65. This is a type of structured credit product introduced in 2006; it is
discussed briefly to show the constant innovation in the credit derivatives
market. See Paul Davies, Questions lie behind CPDO hype: The new kid on the
block has made a big impact, but investors should take a long look before they
leap, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006, at 43 (discussing the impact of CPDOs on the
credit market). Such innovation is a constant attempt to more efficiently
allocate risk, and may not be possible if the market was directly regulated, as
discussed infra.
66. LIBOR refers to the London Inter Bank Offer Rate, an interest rate that
is published daily and commonly used as a reference rate in derivatives and




defaults. A reserve is built up that will be used as a cushion
for any future defaults and to pay back principal at the
maturity date. This investment product has a high rating,
but is not guaranteed-the initial investor is really taking
an equity position in exchange for its principal investment,
but in a strategy that has been modeled and supposedly
tested to ensure a relatively high degree of certainty of
payment of coupon and principal.
67
These brief discussions of basic types of credit
derivatives and the more current complex adaptations are
meant only as a broad overview, to convey the complexity
and constant innovation of the credit derivatives market.
The product descriptions were brief and summary in
nature, not delving into many of the subtleties and
intricacies that underlie these instruments, and were
offered to establish a context in which to place the recent
market developments.
As a final introductory note concerning credit
derivatives, it is important to mention that credit
derivatives can be settled in two ways: physical settlement
and cash settlement. Upon the occurrence of a credit event
that obligates the seller to compensate the buyer, physical
settlement involves the credit protection buyer delivering to
the protection seller the underlying reference obligation, in
exchange for the par value of the reference obligation. For
cash settlement, the protection seller merely compensates
the buyer for the buyer's net loss from the credit event by
the reference entity. This is a simple form of netting, a
concept which will be discussed infra, in the context of
netting multiple transactions between parties.
67. This brief discussion of CPDOs in the preceding two paragraphs relied
on information found at: CITIGROUP, CORPORATE AND INVESTMENT BANKING,
CPDOs THE NEw BEST SELLER? (Nov. 10, 2006) available at
http://www.nuclearphynance.com/User%20Files/464/Citi cpdos%20-
%20the%20new%20best%20seller.pdf (giving a comprehensive discussion of
CPDOs); Davies, supra note 65, at 43 (giving a brief description of CPDO
mechanics). However, there has been some controversy regarding the AAA
ratings that some CPDOs, especially early ones, received from ratings agencies.
See Paul J. Davies, Fitch Criticizes Ratings of CPDOs, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2007, at 39.
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IV. THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CREDIT DERIVATIVES
MARKET
As mentioned above, the credit derivatives market has
been developing very quickly over a relatively short period
of time.68 This Comment will focus on the recent industry
initiatives that have helped shape that market during 2005-
2006, focusing on the fourteen dealers who, through a
collective initiative, collaborated under the supervision of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and other
regulators, to solve the problems facing the market in 2005.
Additionally, in Part VI, this industry initiative will then be
discussed as a potential model for the future of U.S.
regulation.
In February 2005, the Financial Services Authority
69
(FSA) issued a letter "to all financial institutions that are
active in the credit derivatives market,"70 calling attention
to the widespread "level of unsigned confirmations [71] with
some transactions remaining unconfirmed for months."
72
68. See text accompanying supra notes 39-41.
69. The FSA is the United Kingdom financial markets' regulatory body, it
"is an independent non-governmental body, given statutory powers by the
Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 .... The FSA is accountable to the
Treasury Ministers, and through them to Parliament. It is operationally
independent of Government, and is funded entirely by the firms it regulates.
See Fin. Servs. Auth., Who are we, http://www.fsa.gov.uklPages/AboutWho/
index.shtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
70. Letter from Gay Huey Evans, Dir., Mkt. Servs. Div., Fin. Servs. Auth.,
to CEOs (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uklpubs/ceol
derivatives_22feb05.pdf [hereinafter FSA Letter].
71. "A confirmation sets out the terms and conditions of a credit derivative
transaction .... While the economic terms of the transactions can be agreed
upon upfront, confirmation problems can be traced back to a number of non-
economic, technical issues." N. Y Fed Said Pleased With Banks' Plan To Address
Key Credit Derivatives Issues, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1682
(Oct. 10, 2005). "Confirmations serve as an internal control to verify that both
parties agree to the trade terms and have accurately recorded the trade in their
systems. For this reason, trades should be confirmed as soon as possible." GAO
REPORT, supra note 38, at 15. "Though transactions become legally binding once
agreed to over the telephone, regulators are concerned that the backlog of
confirmations would become an operational nightmare if credit markets were
rocked by, for example, a series of corporate defaults." N.Y Fed Hails Banks'
Progress In addressing Credit Derivatives Issues, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 41,
at 1713 (Oct. 17, 2005).
72. FSA Letter, supra note 70.
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The FSA recognized that credit derivatives provided a
number of benefits, including as a tool for diversifying risk
and a method for bringing increased liquidity to all
segments of the credit market, but was concerned that
operational deficiencies could have a potentially
devastating impact on the global market through the
misunderstandings and uncertainty that arise from
unconfirmed transactions. 73
The FSA asked that individual firms consider their
"operational processes and risk management frameworks-
and the resourcing of these in relation to credit
derivatives-to assess their robustness in this rapidly
evolving market .... And more specifically [make sure that]
the necessary steps are in place to tackle the level of
outstanding confirmations in credit derivatives."74 These
backlogs were the result of the rapidly growing volume of
trading, and the inefficient manual confirmation processes
and difficulties in confirming a trade that may have been
unilaterally assigned to another party.75 The average
number of trades at the largest dealers increased from 644
trades per week in 2004 to 1,450 trades per week in 2005.76
By the end of September 2005, among the fourteen largest
credit derivatives dealers, there were over 150,000
unconfirmed trades, with nearly two-thirds remaining
unconfirmed for more than thirty days.77
A few weeks after the FSA letter, the Joint Forum 78
73. Id.; see also Press Release, Fin. Servs. Auth., FSA Warns Firms on OTC
Credit Derivatives Administration (Feb. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/PR/2005/022.shtml.
74. FSA Letter, supra note 70.
75. Confirmations take place in the "back office," where the trades were
recorded, verified and confirmed through largely manual processes. In contrast,
the "front office" is where the traders and sales staff execute the deal by
interacting with the customer. GAO REPORT, supra note 38, at 8.
76. Id. at 11.
77. Id. at 3.
78. "The Joint Forum was established in 1996 under the aegis of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) to deal with issues common to the banking,
securities and insurance sectors, including the regulation of financial
conglomerates. The Joint Forum is comprised of an equal number of senior
bank, insurance and securities supervisors representing each supervisory
constituency." Bank for Int'l Settlements, Joint Forum, http://www.bis.orgbcbs/
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issued a report, by its Working Group on Risk Assessment
and Capital, on Credit Risk Transfer activity. 79 This report
contained seventeen recommendations to improve the
present state of credit risk transfer (CRT) activity,
"focus[ing] more narrowly on the newest forms of CRT, in
particular on those activities associated with credit
derivatives. °80 This report had several suggestions aimed
directly at improving the credit derivatives market, but also
acknowledged the "willingness of market participants to
address such issues prior to specific regulatory pressures to
do so, as well as the existence of effective mechanisms to
undertake such collective efforts."8
1
The report identified four main issues in the credit
derivatives market: (1) counterparty credit risk; (2) legal
uncertainty; (3) timely matching and confirmations; and (4)
what can broadly be characterized as model risk.8 2 The
Joint Forum Report recommended that parties to credit
derivative transactions take every effort to ensure that they
are adequately assessing the risks posed by such
transactions, including establishing the credit worthiness of
counterparties, and assessing their aggregate risk to
individual market participants.8 3 Other factors to consider
were whether the risk models used by market participants
were adequately assessing factors such as correlation and
jointforum.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
79. JOINT FORUM, CREDIT RISK TRANSFER (Mar. 2005), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/jointl3.pdf [hereinafter JOINT FORUM REPORT]. It should
be noted here, that while the JOINT FORUM REPORT was published in March
2005, it was circulated for comment in October 2004, and was cited as a
motivating force behind the FSA Letter urging the credit derivatives market to
take action to improve its infrastructure. Id. at 1; FSA Letter, supra note 70.
80. JOINT FORUM REPORT, supra note 79, at 1.
81. Id. at 16 (pointing out issues where the market has taken upon itself to
address perceived vulnerabilities: creating a database for CDS reference entity
names, developing services to support matching and confirmation, development
of standardized documents, and development of voluntary standards for
appropriate use of non-public information).
82. Id. at 2-3.
83. Id. at 25-29 (stressing the importance of parties conducting their own
assessment of parties credit worthiness and not simply relying on external
rating services, emphasizing that ratings across different types of investments
do not necessarily correspond, i.e., a AAA rating for a bond differs in risk profile
from a AAA rating for a credit default swap).
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adequacy of collateral posted for transactions.8 4
The Joint Forum Report also provided
recommendations for improving legal certainty by stepping
up efforts in standardization of documentation and
increased automation, as well as being particularly careful
with how parties handle confidential non-public
information.8 5 The Joint Forum also echoed the concern of
the FSA in the level of unsigned confirmations for
transactions in the credit derivatives market,
recommending greater implementation of automation in the
confirmation process to address this issue. The report also
commented on the issue of the practice of undocumented
assignment of existing contracts to third-parties without
the consent of the original counterparty.
In general, the report offered the above
recommendations for the credit derivatives market, as well
as the broader credit market recommendation that
participants perform more comprehensive stress testing
and scenario analysis; to take into account possible
unfavorable changes in the currently benign market
structure, focusing on the high concentration of risk in a
relatively few number of market participants and the
correlative effects that one such participant's default would
have on the market as a whole, and the effects particular to
each participant's aggregate risk exposure to that
defaulting party.8 6
84. Firms should dynamically (i.e., constantly) reassess the amount of
collateral required for a transaction, and not simply rely on a one-time
calculation. Also, parties need to assess the correlative effects across their
aggregate transactions, the possible correlations between the protection seller
and reference entity, and the possible change in liquidity of contracts, especially
complex products, in the face of a default buy a major market participant. Id. at
29-30.
85. Id. at 31-34. The report highlighted problems associated with corporate
and debt restructuring, and the effect on corresponding credit derivative
reference obligations. It also pointed out the need for greater standardization in
documentation to eliminate uncertainty and misunderstandings, especially as
products become more complex. The report applauded ISDA for its part in
creating many of the current standardized documents in the market, and
encouraged the ISDA to continue its efforts in this area.
86. Id. at 35-36. Other general recommendations included ensuring that
market participants employ sufficient personnel to deal with the increasing
complexity of the credit markets, and the need for supervisors and management




In July 2005, another report highlighted critical
deficiencies in the credit derivatives market infrastructure:
the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II
(CRMPG II) Report.8 7 The CRMPG II Report was a private
sector initiative that voluntarily took action to provide a
framework for financial stability. This report issued 47
Guiding Principles and Recommendations8 8 that should be
used as a framework for anticipating, preparing for and
preventing potential financial shocks to the global financial
markets in this era of increasing complexity. Many of these
principles and recommendations are applicable to the credit
derivatives market, and some are specifically addressed to
that audience.
One of the major issues in the credit derivatives market
identified in the CRMPG II Report was the backlog of
confirmations.8 9 The CRMPG II called for an industry-wide
meeting to address this problem:
CRMPG II endorses the convening of an industry-wide roundtable
in the near term to focus on aggressively reducing confirmation
backlogs by working toward further technological and operational
87. COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP II, TOWARD GREATER
FINANCIAL STABILITY: A PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVE (July 27, 2005), available
at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/ [hereinafter CRMPG II REPORT].
On January 15, 2005, the organizational meeting of the Counterparty
Risk Management Policy Group II (CRMPG II) was held in New York.
CRMPG II is comprised of senior officials from major financial
institutions and is chaired by E. Gerald Corrigan, Managing Director,
Goldman Sachs [and former NY Fed president] . . . . The primary
purpose of CRMPG II-building on the 1999 report of CRMPG I-is to
examine what additional steps should be taken by the private sector to
promote the efficiency, effectiveness and stability of the global financial
system.
Id. at 1. The CRMPG I report issued in 1999 had similar objectives: improving
on "(i) counterparty credit assessment, (ii) risk management, measurement and
reporting, (iii) market practices, and (iv) conventions and regulatory reporting."
Zdenka Seiner Griswold, Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II: OTC
Documentation Practices in a Changing Risk Environment, in BROKER-DEALER
REG. 177, 179 (ALI-ABA ed., 2006) (offering a comprehensive discussion of the
CRMPG II REPORT, particularly as it relates to the OTC derivatives markets).
88. CRMPG II REPORT, supra note 87, at 13-40 (listing the 47 Guiding
Principles and Recommendations).
89. Id. at 74-76.
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enhancements, and by strengthening backoffice operations. 90
The CRMPG II recommended further development of
automated trade processing and matching, such as
electronic trade platforms, with the ultimate goal of"straight through processing," as the best way to achieve
increased efficiency in the market. 91 Another major issue
was netting. This is the process of settling transactions
between parties by allowing off-setting obligations to cancel
each other out: theoretically leading to a single payment
from one party to its counterparty, regardless of the
number of transactions between them. The CRMPG II
Report recommended increased use of netting across like-
kind obligations, cross-product obligations, across master
agreements, and in collateral arrangements whenever the
parties are certain of its legal enforceability. 92
The CRMPG also applauded the efforts that the
derivatives markets have made in standardization of
90. Id. at 75.
91. See id. at 77-84, which discusses some of the automated trade matching
and processing platforms available in the market, including DTCC (discussed
infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text), eConfirm, SwapClear, and
Swapswire, and the benefits of these developing market innovations. The
ultimate goal for the market should be straight through processing, which
would "reduce[ ]the number and frequency of trade disputes and maximizes
market efficiency, opportunity and access. STP therefore fosters legal, credit,
market and operational certainty." Id. at 84. Straight through processing has
been the goal for many markets seeking to eliminate the need for human
intervention in processing orders and confirmations, thereby expediting and
reducing the possibility of mistakes in the process.
92. The CRMPG II cited approvingly the available netting possibilities in
the DTCC and SwapClear, as well as the netting approach available in the
IFXCO Master Agreement, the close out valuation methods in the ISDA Master
Agreements of 1992 and 2002, the ISDA Bridge Agreement, Bond Market
Association's Cross-Product Master Agreements, and the legal opinions
gathered by the ISDA in many jurisdictions, confirming the enforceability of its
Bridge Agreement. See id. at 85-95. The IFXCO Master Agreement governs
foreign exchange and currency derivatives. Id. The close out valuation methods
in the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement (Market Quotation and Loss) and the
method in the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement (Close-out Amount) provide for
netting obligations under a single master agreement. Id. The ISDA Bridge and
Bond Market Association Cross-Product Master Agreements provide for netting
of obligations across more than master agreement. Id. The CRMPG II also
applauded the efforts of many jurisdictions, including in the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code and U.S. bank insolvency laws, for their efforts to adopt legislation
consistent with netting enforcement. Id. at 93-94.
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documents and definitions, thanks in large part to the
efforts of the ISDA, but emphasized the need for further
progress in this area for greater legal and systemic
certainty, as well as a necessary step in the furtherance of
developing a greater degree of automation.
9 3
Other specific issues regarding credit derivatives
included many of the same concerns voiced by the Joint
Forum, including: concern over the practice of assigning
trades without consent,94 potential failures in properly
assessing counterparty credit risk,95 possibility of unknown
correlations in the market, 96 and legal risks that could be
better avoided through greater standardization of
documentation, with the ultimate goal of straight through
processing.97
The CRMPG II Report has one central theme:
increasing complexity, 98 which gives rise to the necessity for
increased vigilance in monitoring and evaluation of risk
management procedures, and overall policies through
improved stress testing, scenario analysis and modeling of
risk.99  The CRMPG II Report was a foundational
undertaking by the private sector that paved the way for
the progress made by the credit derivatives market under
the guidance of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (NY
Fed).
The CRMPG II called for an immediate "industry-wide
roundtable . . . to focus on aggressively reducing
confirmation backlogs."'100 The NY Fed was quick to
respond, sending a letter to fourteen key Wall Street firms
on August 12, 2005, calling for such a meeting "to discuss
how best to address a range of important issues in the
credit derivatives market."''1 That meeting took place at
93. Id. at 101-05 (focusing especially on harmonization of documents for
cross-agreement application).
94. Id. at 115-16.
95. Id. at 110-12.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 10.
99. Id. at § V.
100. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
101. N.Y Fed Invites Wall Street Firms to Discuss Use of Credit Derivatives,
[Vol. 551396
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the NY Fed on September 15, 2005, focusing on the issues
in the credit derivatives market "with regard to
assignments of trades and operational issues associated
with confirmation backlogs. ' 102  Fourteen industry
participants took part in the meeting, along with fifteen
supervising/regulatory entities also in attendance. 0 3 "The
industry participants outlined a number of concrete steps to
achieve [the] goals."'1
0 4
On October 4, 2005, the fourteen industry participants
(referring to themselves as the "Major Dealers")10 5 sent a
letter to the NY Fed, outlining their collective progress and
giving an update on the "next steps toward improving
Credit Derivatives industry practices and confirmation
backlogs.' 0 6 The Major Dealers stated that they had met
37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1450 (Aug. 29, 2005) (quoting N.Y. Fed.
Reserve Bank President, Timothy Geithner); see Riva D. Atlas, Fed Officials
Summon Wall Street Firms to Discuss Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at
C5; Henny Sender, Michael Mackenzie & Ramez Mikdashi, Fed, Banks Will
Meet Over Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2005, at C3.
102. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement Regarding
Meeting on Credit Derivatives, (Sept. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2005/an050915.html; see
also Riva D. Atlas, Trying to Put Some Reins on Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2005, at C7 (quoting one banker who attended the meeting but wished to
remain anonymous as saying "[riegulators wanted to get everyone together to
make sure the industry knew they were concerned. It was left to the industry to
come back with solutions."); Henry Sender, Credit Derivatives and Their Risks
are on the Table, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2005, at C1 (quoting Thomas Russo, Vice
Chairman of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., as referring to the issues of
market infrastructure discussed at the meeting as the "plumbing of the
market"); N.Y. Fed, Wall Street Firms Mull Thorny Credit Derivatives Issues, 37
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1527 (Sept. 19, 2005).
103. For a list of the industry participants and regulatory entities in
attendance, see Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., List of Attendees,
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2005[DerivativesParticip
ants.doc (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). Many of these participants were also
involved in CRMPG II.
104. Statement Regarding Meeting on Credit Derivatives, supra note 102;
see also Wall Street Firms to Submit Plan to Shrink Confirmation Backlog, 37
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1632 (Oct. 3, 2005) (stating that the next
step in the process would be a plan in the form of a letter from the market
participants which would be released in early Oct. 2005).
105. Also known as the "Fed 14." See, e.g., New York Fed's Geithner Urges
Care in Use of Credit Derivatives, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 21, at 882 (May 22,
2006).
106. Letter from Senior Mgmt. of the Fourteen Indus. Participants, to
Timothy Geithner, Pres. of Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. (Oct. 4, 2005), available
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regularly since the Sept. 15, 2005 meeting at the NY Fed,
and had established an initial framework for improving the
infrastructure of the market by:
* committing to provide monthly metrics;
10 7
* committing to implement and adhere to the ISDA 2005
Novation Protocol, 10 8 to provide proper procedure for
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2005/industryletter.pdf
[hereinafter First Industry Letter]; see also N.Y Fed Said Pleased with Banks'
Plan to Address Key Credit Derivatives Issues, supra note 71, at 1682
(summarizing the issues discussed in the letter); N.Y Fed Hails Banks'
Progress in Addressing Credit Derivatives Issues, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 41, at 1713 (Oct. 17, 2005) (further discussing the content of the letter).
107. First Industry Letter, supra note 106.
To enable the regulators to monitor the dealers' progress as part of the
joint regulatory initiative, the 14 dealers agreed to collect data on their
credit derivatives activities, including trading volume, unconfirmed
trades, and trades confirmed using automated systems. Under the
agreement, the dealers provide their individual data to Markit Group,
a provider of independent data, portfolio valuations, and OTC
derivatives trade processing. In turn, Markit Group aggregates the
data across the dealers to protect the confidentiality of each dealer's
data and then provides the regulators with aggregate data in a
monthly report.
GAO REPORT, supra note 38, at 20.
108. The ISDA 2005 Novation Protocol amends the ISDA Master
Agreements to allow for the transfer of an obligation or interest under the
requires Agreement without written consent of the Remaining Party (i.e., email
and fax consent is satisfactory). INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, 2005
NOVATION PROTOCOL, (published Sept. 12 2005), available at http://isda.org
(follow "ISDA Protocols" hyperlink; then follow "2005 Novation Protocol"
hyperlink; then follow "2005 Novation Protocol Text and Form of Adherence
Letter" hyperlink; then follow "here" hyperlink for text). All adhering parties,
when in the position of Transferor, are required to obtain consent from the
Remaining Party on the day of proposed novation, and provide detail sufficient
to identify the transaction being transferred, and upon consent of the
Remaining Party, provide notice of that consent to the Transferee. Id. at Annex
1. When in the position of the Remaining Party, adhering parties may withhold
consent to a novation for any reason, but must provide notice of whether it
consents to the Transferor by 6:00 p.m. on the day of the novation. Id. When in
the position of Transferee, upon notice of consent by the Remaining Party it
must confirm all relevant details of the transaction being transferred. Id. If
consent is not provided by the Remaining Party, the rights and obligations vis a
vis the Transferor and Transferee are still in effect, but the Transferor
effectively becomes a "pass-through" and acts as a conduit whereby the
obligations of the Transferee and Remaining Party flow through the Transferor,
but Transferor remains as counterparty to both, rather than stepping out of the
transaction and allowing the Remaining Party and Transferee to become
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assigning trades to third-parties;
10 9
" establishing target dates and levels by which to
aggressively reduce confirmation backlogs by putting in
place appropriate procedures and policies to achieve the
reduction;
110
* committing to move the industry, over time, to a T + 5
standard for vanilla confirmations;
1 1 1
" committing to fully use the DTCC 1 12 in its existing
counterparties. Id. All novations will be documented by all parties entering into
a Novation Confirmation as soon as practicable after the novation. Id.; see also
Guide to Implementation of the 2005 ISDA Novation Protocol, available at
http://isda.org (follow "ISDA Protocols" hyperlink; then follow "2005 Novation
Protocol" hyperlink; then follow "Guide to the Implementation of the 2005
Novation Protocol" hyperlink) (offering a comprehensive explanation of the
novation terms in the Protocol).
109. First Industry Letter, supra note 106. The Major Dealers committed to
setting an effective date for the ISDA 2005 Novation Protocol of October 24,
2005, and finalizing a Guide to support implementation of that Protocol. Id. The
highlights of the Guide include: (1) obligation of the transferor to obtain written
consent from the remaining Party on the novation trade date; and (2) a process
for notification and method for communication. Id. A novation is "[t]he act of
substituting for an old obligation a new one that either replaces an existing
obligation with a new obligation or replaces an original party with a new party."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1094 (8th ed. 2004). In this context, it deals with one
counterparty assigning its obligation to a contract to another party, often
without informing or getting the consent from its original counterparty.
110. The Major Dealers committed to make significant progress on the
reduction of their backlogs. First Industry Letter, supra note 106. ("The Major
Dealers commit that by January 31, 2006, we will each reduce our number of
confirmations outstanding more than 30 days by 30% from our number of
confirmations outstanding more than 30 days as of September 30, 2005 ....
The Major Dealers commit to set a further aggressive target for March 31, 2006.
We will finalize this target by December 15, 2005, when we expect to have
substantial knowledge of the impacts of automation advances, lock-ins, and the
Novation Protocol.")
111. The ultimate goal will be moving the industry to a standard of all
vanilla (plain or simple) confirmations taking place within five days after the
trade or transaction and to "dramatically increase utilization of automated
matching through DTCC and to change the current market practices on
novations [which] will lay the foundation for moving to that standard, which
will be met through high levels of automated processing." Id.
112. The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) provides
electronic clearance, settlement and information services for a wide range of
derivative products, including OTC derivatives. DTCC, About DTCC: An
Overview, http://www.dtcc.com/about/business/index.php (last visited Oct. 5,
2007). DTCC Deriv/Serv is a matching and settlement service that provides for
payment netting and settlement, and can accommodate virtually all standard
credit default swap transactions; it has gained wide industry acceptance
globally and is partnered with the Reference Entity Data (RED) service. DTCC,
DTCC Deriv /Serv, http://www.dtcc.com/ProductsAndServices/derivserv/
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functionality, and requiring all active clients to subscribe
to industry-accepted electronic trading platforms;1 13
" continuing to encourage all clients to sign up with
DTCC;
1 14
* continuing to refine the cash settlement process for
integration into master confirmations for North American
index contracts; and using protocols and the auction
process in the event of any credit events in the interim;115
and
* active use of the "tear up" process to reduce open trades in
distressed names.
116
The Major Dealers followed their first letter with a
second in December 2005, again reporting their progress
and setting a second target date and level for reduction of
index.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
113. The Major Dealers committed to fully using DTCC existing
functionality by October 31, 2005. It will also requires all active clients to
subscribe to DTCC or alternative industry accepted electronic matching
platforms, by January 15, 2006, and require all clients who trade on average
one time per week over the prior three months to subscribe to subscribe and use
DTCC by March 31, 2006. First Industry Letter, supra note 106.
114. Id.
115. The Major Dealers worked with the ISDA to complete the Delta &
Northwest CDS Index Protocol to deal with the settlement of contracts to which
Delta and Northwest were reference entities after the two airlines filed for
bankruptcy. Thanks in large part to the efforts of the ISDA and industry
participants, the obligations of Delta and Northwest were settled without the
chaos predicted by some in the face of a large reference entity default. See e.g.
Geithner Says Credit Derivatives Bolster Financial System Stability, 38 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 479 (Mar. 20, 2006) (stating "[a] critical issue
going forward for the dealers involves establishing policies, procedures, and
documentation for settlement of credit default swaps in the aftermath of a
default by a reference entity."). The Major Dealers pledge to keep working with
the ISDA to refine the ad hoc protocol process for settlement of defaulting entity
obligations. The ISDA has subsequently developed protocols to deal with the
defaults of Delphi, Dura, Dana, and Calpine. See ISDA, ISDA Protocols,
http://isda.org (follow "ISDA Protocols" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
The Major Dealers also formed a working group to further integrate cash
settlement processes for North American index contracts by March 2006, the
next index roll (a process in which indices change the composition of their
members to ensure that the index remains representative of the most liquid
entities; usually takes place every six months). First Industry Letter, supra
note 106.
116. The Major Dealers scheduled an industry tear-up on October 7, 2005.
First Industry Letter, supra note 106. For a description of a "tear-up," see infra
note 138.
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outstanding confirmations.1 17
Another meeting of the Major Dealers at the NY Fed
was scheduled for February 16, 2006, to discuss the
progress on the commitments outlined in the two letters. 118
After that February meeting, the NY Fed announced that it
was encouraged by the progress that the Major Dealers had
made in fulfilling the commitments outlined in their first
letter, and their commitment to continue working together
on those issues. 119 The Major Dealers had exceeded their
target level of 30% reduction in unconfirmed trades for
January, and as a whole had achieved a 54% reduction. 120
The Major Dealers had also adhered to the ISDA 2005
Novation Protocol for the assigning of trades, and increased
use of electronic trade processing from 46% in September
2005 to 62% by January 2006.121 The NY Fed was quoted as
saying, "the industry group is committed to continue
making progress in these areas and .... will outline a set of
conditions that would define acceptable market practices
for post-trade processing."' 22
Following the February meeting at the NY Fed, the
117. Letter from Senior Mgmt. of the Fourteen Indus. Participants, to
Timothy Geithner, Pres. of Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. (Dec. 16, 2005), available
at http://newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2006/industryletter.pdf
[hereinafter Second Industry Letter]. The Major Dealers committed to reducing
outstanding confirmations of more than thirty days by 50% from the September
30, 2005 number of confirmations outstanding more than thirty days by April
30, 2006. Id.
118. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., February 16 Meeting on
Credit Derivatives (Jan. 12, 2006), available at
http://newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2006/an060112.html.
119. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement Regarding




122. N.Y Fed Pleased by Banks' Progress in Addressing Credit Derivatives
Targets, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 322 (Feb. 27, 2006); see also
Henry Sender, Concerns Dog Credit Derivatives-Industry Group Symposium
Explores Market Imbalances Bankruptcies May Trigger, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1,
2006, at C3 (discussing the progress made in the credit derivatives market since
the first Major Dealer meeting, but recognizing that there is still work to be
done, especially with regard to issues such as stress testing and scenario
analysis which need to take into acount the possible strain caused by the exit
of a major player in the credit derivatives market which has a concentrated
dealer base).
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Major Dealers sent a third letter to the NY Fed. 123 They
outlined further steps they were planning to take to
improve the infrastructure of the credit derivatives
markets:
* moving towards a largely electronic market place;12 4
* developing standard industry timelines for affirmation and
confirmation of trades;
125
" developing an "industry trade warehouse;" 126
* developing new procedures for settlement following a
123. Letter from Senior Mgmt. of the Fourteen Indus. Participants, to
Timothy Geithner, Pres. of Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. (Mar. 10, 2006), available
at http://newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2006/industryletter2.pdf
[hereinafter Third Industry Letter].
124. The Major Dealers committed to implementing industry wide best
practice guidelines, which include processing electronically all trades that are
so capable of being processed (called Eligible Trades), with straight through
processing as the ultimate industry goal. Id.; see also Credit Derivatives Dealers
Issue New Set Of Commitments For Industry improvement, 38 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 479 (Mar. 20, 2006) (quoting Corrigan, former NY Fed
chairman and organizer of CRMPG II, as saying that "fully automated, or
'straight through,' trade processing that would require virtually no human
intervention is a key long term industry goal.").
125. "Details of Eligible Trades should be submitted to the relevant
Electronic Platform no later than T + 1 business day and matched/affirmed (and
any rejections/exceptions/discrepancies resolved) no later than T + 5 business
days. Confirmation for non-Eligible Trades should be issued no later than T +
10 calendar days." Third Industry Letter, supra note 123. All trades should be
confirmed (or resolved) no later than T + 30 calendar days. Id.
126. The Major Dealers were working with DTCC to create "a central trade
information warehouse for credit derivatives--essentially a comprehensive
database containing the 'golden copy' of each contract-and a central support
infrastructure that standardizes and automates downstream processes
throughout the life of each contract." Id. The DTCC Deriv/Serv Trade
Information Warehouse was launched in September 2006. See DTCC
Deriv/Serv, Trade Information Warehouse: A Practical Guide for the Buy Side,
http://derivserv.dtcc.com/binary/
31182A%2OPractical%2OGuide--%2OReleaselO-06.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2007)
(a comprehensive description of the services provided by Deriv/Serv and the
Trade Information Warehouse). "The initial Warehouse Eligible Transactions
will be single name CDS (both corporate and Sovereign using master
confirmation agreements, default master confirmation agreements or the ISDA
physical settlement matrix), CDS Index products, and Tranched index products,
all being confirmable through Deriv/SERV confirmation services as of June 1,
2006." BOND MKT. ASS'N, THE ASSET MANAGERS FORUM WEEKLY REP., AMD
Speaks on CDS Automation, Sept. 22, 2006, available at
http://www.theassetmanager.com/WeeklyReport/092206.html (discussing the
DTCC Trade Information Warehouse); see also Clearing the Derivatives
Backlog, DIALOUGUE, THE VOICE OF THE SWIFT CMTY. (Q2 2006), at 22.
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credit event; 127 and
further reduction in unconfirmed confirmations.
12 8
The Major Dealers pledged "[o]ngoing [c]ommitment to
[m]aintaining [i]ndustry [m]omentum;" recognizing that
"[w]e may find that a tactical step that we think will solve
the problem today may not, without modification, get us all
the way to the steady state,"129 highlighting the flexible
nature of the initiative, which allows the market to self-
correct and "self-regulate" (an integral element of the
regulatory model advocated in this Comment in Part VI).
The NY Fed was again "encouraged by the cooperation
and progress made to date."130 At a meeting in Washington
in June 2006, Federal Reserve Board Governor Susan
Schmidt Bies, stated "[w]e are generally pleased with both
the industry's self-identification of the issues and its
commitment to making improvements."
131
The Major Dealers continued their efforts at
maintaining the momentum of their industry initiative,
calling for greater participation by the industry in a July
2006 letter to their fellow credit derivatives market
participants. 132 The Major Dealers called for increased
127. The Major Dealers were working with the "ISDA, the members of CDS
IndexCo LLC and International Index Company, and various service providers
to develop a new framework for the settlement of credit derivatives contracts
following a credit event. The settlement solution will provide for net physical
settlement at a single auction-based price." Third Industry Letter, supra note
123.
128. "Each Major Dealer commits to a 70% reduction in its number of
confirmations outstanding for more than 30 days on June 30, 2006 from those
outstanding more than 30 days on September 30, 2005." Id.
129. Id.
130. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., New York Fed Welcomes
New Industry Commitments on Credit Derivatives (Mar. 13, 2006), available at
http://newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2006/an060313.html
[hereinafter NY Fed Press Release].
131. Susan Schmidt Bies, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Address at the
Financial Women's Association Washington Briefing: A Supervisor's
Perspective on Enterprise Risk Management (June 12, 2006) (speaking on
enterprise risk management issues facing the markets).
132. Letter from Senior Mgmt. of the Fourteen Indus. Participants, to
Fellow Credit Derivatives Mkt. Participants & Clients (July 19, 2006), available
at http://isda.org [hereinafter Letter to Market Participants]; see also Credit
Derivatives Dealers Cut Backlog of Confirmations by 80 Percent, 38 Sec. Reg. &
20081 1403
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support to realize industry-wide targets, such as:
comprehensive timelines for all trade confirmations;
continued progress towards electronically confirming a
higher percentage of trades for all credit derivative
products; adoption of new DTCC functionality; backloading
existing transactions onto the DTCC (or equivalent);
continued diligence in prompt execution of novations;
standardized and harmonized documentation and
procedures for all transactions; and, for all market
participants to ensure that they had the resources in place
to conform to all industry best practices. 133
A third meeting of the Major Dealers and regulators
was held at the NY Fed on September 27, 2006.134 The NY
Fed reviewed the progress made by the Major Dealers over
the last year:
" ended the market practice of assigning trades without
obtaining prior consent of the counterparties,
* reduced the number of all confirmations outstanding by
70% and confirmations outstanding for more than 30 days
by 85%,
* doubled the share of trades that are confirmed on an
electronic platform to 80% of total trade volume, and
* agreed upon a protocol for the settlement of a credit
event. 135
The NY Fed remarked that "it is important that the
market participants sustain their progress toward a more
automated post-trade processing environment where the
vast majority of trades are now processed electronically and
where there are strong risk mitigants for more complex
trades," as well as "robust adoption" of the new DTCC
Deriv/Serv Trade Information Warehouse. 136
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1270 (July 24, 2006) (summarizing the Letter to
Market Participants).
133. Letter to Market Participants, supra note 132; see 38 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. No. 30, supra note 132, at 1270 (discussing the progress made by the
Major Dealers to date, and fully automated processing as the long-term
industry goal).
134. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement Regarding
Progress in Credit Derivatives Markets (Sept. 27, 2006), available at
http://newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2006/anO60927.html.
135. Id.
136. Id.; see Credit Derivatives Market Swells to $26 Trillion in Year,
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The regulators, apparently content with the progress
made to date and the commitment to continue to improve,
expressed looking forward to the industry making similar
improvements in equity derivatives trading.137
A. Discussion of the Industry Initiative in the Credit
Derivatives Market
In little over a year, the Major Dealers were able to
make remarkable improvements in the infrastructure of the
credit derivatives market. Through collective effort, they
were able to make an 80% reduction in the level of
unconfirmed trades, 138 and implemented a clear industry-
Association Says, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1590 (Sept. 25, 2006)
(discussing the new statistics announced by the ISDA on Sept. 19 and quoting
Geithner as being happy with the progress made in the credit derivatives
market, but also mindful of the need to remain vigilant).
137. NY Fed Press Release, supra note 130; see Letter from Senior Mgmt. of
the Seventeen Industry Participants, to Timothy Geithner, Pres. of Fed.
Reserve Bank of N.Y. (Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://newyorkfed.org/
newsevents/news/markets/2006/an06112lc.pdf (committing to take similar
initiatives in the equity derivatives markets, as had been made over the course
of the last fourteen months in the credit derivatives markets, including
increased automation and reduction of unconfirmed transactions). This
commitment was welcomed by the NY Fed, which hoped to see similar progress
made in the equity derivatives markets. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of
N.Y., New York Fed Welcomes Industry Commitments on Equity Derivatives
(Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/
2006/an061121.html; see also Firms Meet at N.Y Fed to Ponder Questions on
Credit, Equity Derivatives, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1636 (Oct. 2,
2006) (discussing the meeting on Sept. 27 at the NY Fed); Equity Dealers' Plan
Focuses On Market Efficiency, Standardization, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 47, at 1994 (Dec. 4, 2006) (discussing the equity dealers' letter to NY Fed,
and commitments). The Dealers made a second commitment to the Fed in May
2007, after meeting their target reduction of equity derivative confirmation
backlogs by 25% by the end of January, improving automated processing and
increasing the use of electronic trading platforms. Letter from Senior Mgmt. of
the Eighteen Indus. Participants, to Timothy Geithner, Pres. of Fed. Reserve
Bank of N.Y. (May 15, 2007), available at http://newyorkfed.org/newsevents/
news/markets/2007/FedLetterO5O7.pdf; Dealers' Pledge Added Infrastructure,
Improvements in Second Commitment to Fed, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
20, at 799 (May 21, 2007).
138. GAO REPORT, supra note 38, at 23:
To achieve these reductions in their unconfirmed trade backlogs,
dealers took various steps. For example, dealers engaged in events
called "lock ins" with other dealers and, to a lesser extent, end-users.
Under a lock in, operations staff from either two dealers or staff from
one dealer and one of their key end-user customers convened in a room
1406 BUFFALO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 55
wide protocol to stop novations without consent. Both
problems, if left unchecked, had the potential for
widespread systemic uncertainty in the face of an
unfavorable economic downturn or a default by a heavily
referenced entity. This brings up another point which
should be emphasized: this initiative was a prophylactic
effort, and not the result of immediate necessity due to a
financial shock. 139 This allowed the market to develop
practices and strategies for long-term success, rather than
applying a quick-fix to an immediate problem.
The success of the Major Dealers depended in large part
upon the efforts of not only themselves, but industry
associations, such as the ISDA,140 and other entities that
and compared the trades they had conducted together until all or
almost all were reconciled and confirmed. Dealers and end-users also
used "tear-up services" to reduce the total number of open trades and
thus eliminate the number of trades that needed to be confirmed. In a
tear-up process, an automated system matches up offsetting positions
across many market participants, allowing those trades to be, in effect,
terminated and thereby removing the need to confirm such trades....
To prevent new trades from adding to the backlog, the dealers also
increased their use of automated confirmation systems and set
deadlines for confirming trades.
139. There have been some minor events that have shaken the credit
derivatives markets, but these have been dealt with, notably (1) the bankruptcy
filings of Northwest, Delta, Dephi, and others; and (2) in May 2005, the
unanticipated correlative effects of General Motors rating falling to junk status
and the sharp fall in their bond prices had effects on credit derivative portfolios
and indices which contradicted the models upon which traders had relied. See
Riva D. Atlas, A Relief Some Gains for Hedges, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2005, at Cl;
Jonathan Fuerbringer & Danny Hakim, Fitch Cuts G.M. to Junk, Citing Poor
S. U. V. Sales, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2005, at C3; Mark Whitehouse et. al, The Sky
Darkens for Bondholders-Backfiring Bets on Derivatives, Corporate Executives'
Allegiances Are Among Worries Raising Risk, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2005, at C1.
Only seven reference entities have defaulted since 2005, and the market was
able to effectively settle trades referencing those entities. GAO REPORT, supra
note 38, at 15-16.
140. ISDA, About ISDA, http://isda.org (follow "About ISDA" hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 18, 2007):
ISDA, which represents participants in the privately negotiated
derivatives industry, is the largest global financial trade association,
by number of member firms. ISDA was chartered in 1985, and today
has over 815 member institutions from 56 countries on six continents.
These members include most of the world's major institutions that deal
in privately negotiated derivatives, as well as many of the businesses,
governmental entities and other end users that rely on over-the-
counter derivatives to manage efficiently the financial market risks
inherent in their core economic activities. Since its inception, ISDA has
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serve the technical needs of the market, such as DTCC. The
ISDA's role was integral: developing standardized
documentation for transactions and creating protocols in
the areas of novations, collateral arrangements, settlement,
and netting. The Major Dealers also relied heavily on
continued dialogue with the Managed Fund Association
(MFA)141 and Asset Managers Division of the Bond Market
Association.142 These two associations were instrumental in
pioneered efforts to identify and reduce the sources of risk in the
derivatives and risk management business. Among its most notable
accomplishments are: developing the ISDA Master Agreement;
publishing a wide range of related documentation materials and
instruments covering a variety of transaction types; producing legal
opinions on the enforceability of netting and collateral arrangements
(available only to ISDA members); securing recognition of the risk-
reducing effects of netting in determining capital requirements;
promoting sound risk management practices, and advancing the
understanding and treatment of derivatives and risk management
from public policy and regulatory capital perspectives.
141. MFA, headquartered in Washington, D.C., is the primary trade
association representing professionals who specialize in alternative investment
strategies including hedge funds, funds of funds, and managed futures funds.
MFA's over 1,200 members are affiliated with the majority of the 100 largest
hedge funds, which manage a significant portion of the over $1.2 trillion
invested in hedge funds. Since its inception in 1991, MFA has provided industry
leadership in government relations, communications, media relations, and
education to MFA members and investors. Press Release, Managed Funds
Ass'n, MFA Applauds Recommendations by Senator Schumer and Mayor
Bloomberg (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.mfainfo.org/images/
PDF/SchumerBloomberg.pdf.
142. The Bond Market Association merged with the Securities Industry
Association to form the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(SIFMA) as of November 1, 2006. See, e.g., Out of the Alphabet Soup: SIFMA,
WASH. WIRE, Nov. 1, 2006, http:/blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2006/11/01/out-of-the-
alphabet-soup-sifma/; see also Press Release, SIFMA, SIABMA Merger
Approved by Members, SIFMA Transition Begins: Joint Statement (July 27,
2006), available at http://www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=2536 (discussing
the shareholder approval of the merger).
[SIFMA is an] organization [that] is passionately dedicated to
representing more than 650 member firms of all sizes, in all financial
markets in the U.S. and around the world. We are committed to
enhancing the public's trust and confidence in the markets, delivering
an efficient, enhanced member network of access and forward-looking
services, as well as premiere educational resources for the professionals
in our industry and the investors whom they serve.
SIFMA, Welcome to SIFMA.org, http://www.sifma.org/section.cfm/about (last
visited Feb. 4, 2007).
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the progress made by the Major Dealers. 143
The achievements of the Major Dealers in reducing
backlogs and implementing consent-required novation
practices are all derived from the success of the market in
developing and applying a greater degree of standardization
and automation.
The ISDA paved the way for harmonization and
automation through standardization in documentation in
OTC derivatives. One of the first of such efforts was the
1992 Master Agreements, followed by the revised Master
Agreement in 2002.144 The ISDA has also developed
protocols for Credit Support/Margin 145 and Novation,1 46 as
143. See Third Industry Letter, supra note 123 (acknowledging the
contributions made by these associations); see also MANAGED FUNDS ASS'N,
STATEMENT OF SUPPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE MAJOR DEALERS' STEADY STATE
PROPOSAL (Mar. 13, 2006), available at http://www.managedfunds.org/
downloads/3-13-06MFAFed14_Stmt _3 13 06.pdf (discussing the Major
Dealers initiative and the MFA's continuing support in that undertaking).
144. When two parties negotiate and sign an ISDA Master Agreement, they
agree upon the ongoing legal and credit relationship between them. While they
can, of course, agree to amend the terms of their agreement at any time, there
is no need to negotiate a whole host of issues each time they enter into a new
transaction. Also, unlike many other financial master agreements, the ISDA
Master Agreement can be used to document a range of different types of
transactions (it is "multi-product"). ALLEN & OVERY, LLP, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE DOCUMENTATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES "TEN THEMES" 2 (May 2002),
available at http://isda.org/educat/pdf/ten-themes.pdf (providing a
comprehensive explanation of the structure and format of the standardized
documents created by the ISDA for the OTC derivatives markets). Each
individual transaction between two parties to a Master Agreement becomes a
supplement to the Master Agreement, and therefore incorporates all of the
terms agreed to by the parties in that agreement, allowing parties to negotiate
only the economic terms for each transaction, rather than entire separate
comprehensive agreements. Id. at 2-3.
145. Credit support (a.k.a collateral or margin) are the assets that parties
reserve and designate to ensure that an obligation will be fulfilled, thereby
reducing counterparty credit risk. The ISDA published four Credit Support
Annexes and Deeds in the mid-1990s, but
[t]he 2001 ISDA Credit Support Protocol offers market participants the
ability to amend the 1994 ISDA Credit Support Annex (New York law)
and/or the 1995 ISDA Credit Support Annex (English law). Specifically,
market participants may elect to amend provisions relating to transfer
timing, dispute resolution, substitutions or exchanges of credit support
and certain definitions.
ISDA, 2001 ISDA Credit Support Protocol, http://isda.org (follow "ISDA
Protocols" hyperlink; then follow "2001 ISDA Credit Support Protocol"
hyperlink); see also ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 144, at 5.
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well as publishing Definitions1 47  and gathering legal
opinions on issues facing the enforcement of ISDA
documentation. 148 Another important function of the ISDA
has been the development of protocols for the settlement of
obligations following credit events by the reference
entity.149 The ISDA was also instrumental in developing the
146. See supra note 105, for a discussion of the 2005 ISDA Novation
Protocol. Also, the ISDA issued the Novation Protocol II in February 2006.
"NPII is a free-standing protocol intended for parties that did not adhere to the
2005 Novations Protocol and those that wish to do novations business with
these parties. The 2005 Novations Protocol continues to operate without
amendment." News Release, ISDA, ISDA Opens 'Evergreen' Novation Protocol:
Enables New Entities to Expedite Assignment Process (Feb. 1, 2006), available
at http://isda.org (follow "Press" hyperlink; then follow "Press Releases (2006)
hyperlink; then follow "Press Release" hyperlink for February 1, 2006); see also
ISDA, DETAILS RELATING TO THE ISDA NOVATION PROTOCOL II, available at
http://isda.org (follow "ISDA Novation Protocol" hyperlink; then follow "here"
hyperlink for a brief explanation of the differences between the ISDA Novation
Protocol and the 2005 Novation Protocol) (stating that there are no changes to
the novation terms from the 2005 Novation Protocol to the Novation Protocol
II).
147. ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 144, at 3:
When used in the ISDA sense, "Definitions" are the various booklets of
standard definitions and other terms and provisions published by ISDA
for use in documenting different types of derivatives transactions.
Generally, and broadly, each set of Definitions provides relevant terms
for documenting a particular type of derivatives transaction ...
[S]hort-form Confirmations rely on Definitions. They do this by stating
that they incorporate a particular set (or sets) of Definitions. However,
while they do a lot of the work for the parties, ISDA Definitions do not
take care of everything. The Definitions themselves only provide a
framework for documenting a transaction. It is still up to the parties to
make various choices and to document the economic terms of the
transaction itself in the short-form Confirmation. The parties are also
free, of course, to amend the terms of the relevant Definitions or
include additional provisions in the short-form Confirmation itself.
While the terms of the Definitions represent the result of an extensive
industry consultation process, they will not be appropriate for
documenting all transactions without amendment or additional
provisions.
148. The ISDA gathered legal opinions in many jurisdictions relating to
collateral arrangements, netting, and novation. These opinions are available to
members to ensure that the ISDA documentation in these areas are
enforceable. See ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 144, at 5.
149. The ISDA created ad hoc protocols to deal with settlement of
obligations that became due when a reference entity experienced a credit event.
These protocols typically involve an auction methodology that facilitates
settlement through bidding on acceptable terms of physical and cash
settlement. See ISDA, http://isda.org (follow "ISDA Protocols" hyperlink) (last
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information sharing "language" that allows for automated
trade processing, called FpML.150
Also integral in developing a greater degree of
automation were services such as the DTCC Deriv/Serv, 151
which made substantial progress in increasing the
functionality of electronic trade processing. DTCC
Deriv/Serv Trade Information Warehouse 152 is a massive
undertaking that will revolutionize the OTC derivative
market. It is a centralized repository for all transactions
that will promote efficiency in all aspects of trading:
confirmations, processing, novations, and settlement. The
efforts of the DTCC should be looked at in conjunction with
the collective effort of the Major Dealers-such
developments would most likely have not been so
aggressively pursued if it were not for the joint commitment
to automation by the collective market.
The regulatory agencies also played a vital role in the
improvements in the credit derivatives market, both
through what they did do, and what they did not do. While
the success of the industry initiative should be attributed to
visited Oct. 18, 2007), for a list of protocols that have been developed to deal
with the settlements due to the credit events of Dura Operating Corporation
(filed for bankruptcy on October 30, 2006), Dana Corporation (filed for
bankruptcy on March 3, 2006), Calpine Corporation (filed for bankruptcy on
December 20, 2005), Delphi Corporation (filed for bankruptcy on October 8,
2005), Delta Airlines, Inc. and Northwest Airlines, Inc. (filed for bankruptcy on
September 14, 2005) and Collins & Aikman Products Co. (filed for bankruptcy
on May 17, 2005).
150. FpML, What is FpML?, http://www.fpml.org/factsheet.html (last visited
Feb. 12, 2007) (explaining the development of this standardized "language" for
communicating details of financial transactions which is a necessary step in
increasing automation, as well as the benefits of such standardization and
automation as opposed to the manual process of derivative trading):
FpMI (Financial products Markup Language) is the business
information exchange standard for electronic dealing and processing of
financial derivatives instruments. It establishes a new protocol for
sharing information on, and dealing in swaps, derivatives and
structured products. It is based on XML (Extensible Markup
Language), the standard meta-language for describing data shared
between applications. All categories of over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives will eventually be incorporated into the standard.
151. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text for a description of
DTCC Deriv/Serv.
152. See supra note 126 (discussing the Trade Information Warehouse).
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the market participants, it was the instigation 153 of the
regulatory agencies and threat of their intervention which
initially provoked the efforts of the Major Dealers:
All of the dealers recognized the current weaknesses of their
methods and were desirous of change. However, no individual
dealer could have unilaterally adopted procedures without the
cooperation of the broader group. Today, after the intervention of
the regulators, the infrastructure that supports the credit
derivatives market is substantially stronger.
15 4
As important as the instigation of the process was, this
Comment argues that the stepping back of the regulatory
agencies into a passive role was equally critical to the
success that was achieved. This put the burden on the
market participants to come up with solutions best fitted to
the conditions that existed in the market, a task for which
they, who collectively constitute that market, are best
suited because of their day-to-day experience-much more
so than regulatory agencies who are removed from the
actual market and not in touch with the constant changes
taking place at the market level. It was the joint regulatory
initiative that brought the group of Major Dealers together
and ensured that they would collectively work to correct the
problems facing the market.155
B. Success of the Initiative
The question of the success of the Major Dealer
153. Particularly, the NY Fed call for a meeting of the fourteen major
market participants. See supra note 101 and accompanying text; see also FSA
Letter, supra note 70.
154. Annette L. Nazareth, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before
the Brooklyn Law School Symposium on the Structure of Securities Markets
(Nov. 10, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spchlll006aln.htm.
While this author agrees with the proposition that regulatory agencies were the
"impetus" for the Major Dealers collective efforts, I do not agree with the
characterization of this speech that the success in the credit derivatives should
be attributed to regulatory intervention. See id. As will be discussed infra, the
role that the regulatory agencies played was vital, but limited, which was in
itself a major factor in the success of the initiative.
155. GAO REPORT, supra note 38, at 27-28. "Given that individual efforts
could not fully resolve the backlog problem, U.S. and foreign regulators we
interviewed said that the joint regulatory initiative proved instrumental in
ensuring that the problem was addressed." Id. at 37.
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initiative in solving the problems in the credit derivatives
market has many facets. As far as operational risks, the
market made extraordinary advances in less than a year to
clear 80% of unconfirmed trades. Through collective effort
and reliance on membership organizations such as the
ISDA, the market as a whole has made drastic increases in
the degree of automation and standardization of trades.
There is wide adherence to the ISDA Novation Protocols for
consent-required assignment of trades. All of which leads to
greater operational efficiency and legal certainty. In April of
2006, one U.K. regulator commented:
[T]he credit derivative exercise is well on its way to becoming an
excellent example of the ability of the industry to solve a problem
when it puts its mind to it as well as an excellent example of the
ability of industry and regulators from around the world to work
together to resolve market issues without resorting to writing new
rules.156
This Comment highlights the great success of
implementing an industry initiative process to solve market
problems, but as that regulator pointed out in his address,
there is still work to be done. An 80% reduction in
unconfirmed trades is an impressive improvement, 157 but
there are still a significant percentage of trades that remain
unconfirmed. While the risk posed by unconfirmed trades
has been considerably lessened, it still remains a potent
risk to the market, which must be eradicated (and it should
be noted, the progress continues). A major area of
improvement will be the continued progress in increasing
automation in OTC trades.158
156. Thomas Huertas, Dir., Wholesale Firms Div. & Banking Sector Leader,
Fin. Servs. Auth., Credit Derivatives: Boon to Mankind or Accident Waiting to
Happen?, Remarks Before Rhombus Research Annual Conference (Apr. 26,
2006), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/
Speeches/2006/0426_th.shtml.
157. The Major Dealers also cut the number of total confirmations
outstanding more than 30 days by 94% by October 2006. GAO REPORT, supra
note 38, at 4.
158. See Richard Beales, Continuing Rapid Growth in Deals Stretches
Technological Resources, FIN. TIMES, May 28, 2007, at 18 (warning of the
problems that could creep back into the credit derivatives markets as the
volume of trading continues to increase, and stressing the need for even greater
degree of automation). As proof of the continuing need to increase automation,
many firms experienced a significant amount of backlogs during August 2007 as
[Vol. 551412
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Further progress in the credit derivatives market can
be seen by the pledge of twelve trade associations, including
the ISDA and SIFMA, to "enforce strict self-discipline and
to educate their members and others on how material
nonpublic information should be handled. ' 159 These pledges
come in response to concerns that the pricing of credit
default swaps was moving suspiciously just before the
announcements of leveraged buyouts of the reference
entity. 160 Another issue that remains on the forefront of the
credit derivatives market is how the market will develop in
light of the creation of futures trading in credit
derivatives, 16' and the important role that these could take
on in the financial markets.162
Other important risks still remain prevalent in the
credit derivatives market: model risk163 and risk of systemic
financial shocks.164 These risks are interrelated, both
volumes surged even though more than 90% of trades were being processed
electronically. See Stacy-Marie Ishmael, Back Offices Feeling the Strain of
Credit Crisis Trading Boom, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2007, at 37.
159. Serena Ng, -Trading Groups Are Agitating Over Apparent Leaks on
Street-, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2006, at C3; Non-Tolerance of Misuse of Insider
Info Reaffirmed by Industry Groups, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at
2096 (Dec. 18, 2006).
160. Ng, supra note 159, at C3. These pledges also came in the face of
recognition that the regulatory agencies, i.e., the SEC and CFTC, had no
authority to regulate CDSs. See Kara Scannell, Serena Ng & Alistair
MacDonald, Can Anyone Police the Swaps?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2006, at C1
(stating that the ISDA says that the SEC, which has not brought any actions in
relation to the CDSs, has no jurisdiction because the swaps are private
contracts, and that the CFTC itself says it has no oversight).
161. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade (two
futures exchanges) have launched futures trading of credit derivatives
contracts, most likely expanding the market even further. See Anuj Gangahar
et al., Banks' Unease Helped Drive the Rival Offer, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2007, at
28; Ellen J. Silverman, CME, CBOT Differ on Credit Derivatives, GLOBAL AsS'N
OF RISK PROFESSIONALS, Nov. 9, 2006, http://garp.com/risknews/newsfeed.
asp?Category=6&MyFile=2006-11-09-13811 .html.
162. See Michael Mackenzie & Saskia Scholtes, Default Fear Lifts Demand
for Credit Insurance, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at 35 (describing the important
role of credit derivative index contracts, especially the US CDX, in the current
financial landscape).
163. The risk that your pricing models are not correct, i.e., do not provide
adequate compensation for the risk that you incur in a position. See DURBIN,
supra note 1, at 191.
164. Borrowing a phrase from the CRMPG II REPORT. CRMPG II REPORT,
supra note 87, at 1; see Treasury Official Warns Hedge Funds: Don't Be 'Lulled'
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becoming more prevalent and harder to calculate as
financial products become more complex and harder to
model. 165 Pricing of a position depends on the return that
position offers, but also the risk that the position poses. The
CRMPG II Report and the Joint Forum Report both
advocated better risk management practices through more
comprehensive stress testing and scenario analysis.
166
Those reports pointed out the risk posed by
unknown/uncalculated correlations, which could lead to
systemic loss if one default or shock triggers others-
creating a domino effect. 167
Unfortunately, these risks are hard to mitigate in the
market through collective action. It depends on prudent
risk management policies (hedging positions through
on Possible Systemic Risk, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 942 (June 18,
2007) (warning of the need to increase the sophistication of risk management
systems, especially in the credit markets).
165. See Banks Chart Significant Progress Toward Key Management Goals,
38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 366 (Mar. 6, 2006) (quoting E. Gerald
Corrigan, chairman of CRMPG II: "As complex as it is today, its going to get
more complex-there's no question about that"). Corrigan also said that this
will require market participants to strengthen valuation practices, use more
sophisticated tools to evaluate the relationship between risk and capital,
liquidity and margin, and increase focus on comprehensive forms of stress
testing and scenario analysis. Id.; Paul J. Davies, Banks and Brokers Pay a
Higher Price for Volatility, FIN. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at 37 (describing the
worries over complex products, counterparty risk, and correlations between
various markets).
166. See CRMPG II REPORT, supra note 87, § V (discussing correlation and
modeling risk); JOINT FORUM REPORT, supra note 79, at 35-38 (discussing
potential problems with correlation); Anderson, supra note 39, at C1 (discussing
NY Fed president Geithner's commitment to improve stress testing); Greg Ip &
Carrick Mollenkamp, U.S. & Britain Team Up to Test Financial Risk, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 2, 2006, at Cl (discussing model risk and stress testing in the credit
derivatives market); Emil Henry, Treasury Asst. Sec'y for Fin. Insts., Remarks
at Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Apr. 18, 2006) (discussing the nexus
between hedge funds and credit derivatives and the need for more
comprehensive stress testing); see also Treasury's Henry Urges Attention to Link
Between Hedge Funds, Credit Derivatives, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17,
at 706 (Apr. 24, 2006) (discussing Henry's speech, supra); supra note 139
(discussing the unexpected correlation effects of G.M. bonds being downgraded
to junk status).
167. Much of the recent worries about such systemic risk arises from the
volatility in the credit derivatives market resulting from possible correlations
between the subprime mortgage problems and credit derivatives; "[t]he market
is convinced that somebody out there is holding a big bag of subprime." Scott
Patterson, Default Swaps Could Magnify Credit Crisis, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13,
2007, at C1 (quoting a credit strategist at Deutsche Bank).
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diversification to minimize risk concentration) and proper
attention to correlation in price modeling and overall risk
management models.'68 This is the province of individual
firm policy, and there is no objective measure of
effectiveness for each entity's stress testing and scenario
analysis practices.
The real measure of the success in the credit
derivatives market will probably not be able to be
determined until a truly devastating shock to the market.
Therefore, it is up to each market participant to satisfy
itself that it is making sound decisions and implementing
sound policies to deal with these risks, and unfortunately,
the market as a whole will have to wait until a catastrophic
event impacts the market to find an objective measure of
those efforts.
V. BROADER RECENT REGULATORY CONCERNS
As foreign markets develop and become more stable,
they become increasingly attractive alternatives to U.S.
markets. 16 9 This increase in global competition has led
many to begin reevaluating U.S. regulation of financial
markets. 170 The U.S. has a fragmented regulatory approach
for dealing with the financial world. The banks are
regulated by one set of groups, 171 securities by another, 72
168. See Thomas Huertas, Dir., Wholesale Firms Div., and Banking Sector
Leader, Fin. Servs. Auth., Remarks at the ISDA Regional Conference: One
Down, Two to Go? Challenges Facing the Global Derivatives Industry (Sept. 19,
2006), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/
Speeches/2006/0919_th.shtml (discussing how the industry values derivatives,
and whether that valuation is based on adequate stress testing).
169. See Greg Ip et al., In Call to Deregulate Business, a Global Twist, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at Al; Henry M. Paulson, Sec'y, U.S. Treasury Dep't,
Address at the Competitiveness of U.S. Markets Economic Club of New York
(Nov. 20, 2006), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp174.htm.
170. See, e.g., Michael R. Bloomberg & Charles E. Schumer, To Save New
York, Learn from London, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2006, at A18 (calling for
reevaluation of U.S. regulatory, accounting, and legal systems to maintain U.S.
financial preeminence).
171. Banks are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office
of Thrift Supervision.
172. Securities are regulated by the SEC as well as those self-regulatory
organizations to which the SEC has delegated authority, and is subject to state
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commodities and futures by another, 173 and insurance
companies by still another assemblage of regulators. 174 The
problems associated with this disjointed regulatory set-up
have been at the forefront of many recent discussions of
U.S. regulation.175
This fragmentation leads to redundancy, which
increases costs and reduces efficiency. Compounding the
problem is the internal overlap of regulatory authority
within each individual framework. 176 "As a consequence,
the fragmented U.S. financial regulatory system has
become increasingly filled with friction and even
dysfunctional."177
In today's financial reality, we must ask the question:
does this artificial compartmentalization of industries
create a regulatory framework that is best suited for the
way that markets actually function? More and more
complex financial products are developed which reference
not only securities and bonds, loans, futures, commodities,
regulation from Blue-Sky Laws.
173. The futures and commodities industries are regulated by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the SROs to which it has
delegated rulemaking authority.
174. The insurance industry is regulated by the states, with each state
having its own set of regulations. The regulation of the insurance industry is
the epitome of the redundant and inefficient form of regulation that this
Comment is arguing must be changed. In the insurance industry, each state
maintains its own rules and regulations making every decision made by
insurance companies dependent upon maintaining compliance with, and
seeking approval from, dozens of regulatory agencies; each with its own
standards.
175. See, e.g., MCKINSEY REPORT, infra note 194, at 81 ("Exhibit 21: The U.S.
Regulatory Regime is Complex and Fragmented," illustrating the numerous
regulators assigned to oversee each component of the financial services
markets); '"e have the SEC, CFTC, NASD, MSRB, 50 state insurance
regulators, multiple banking authorities-all looking at specific products within
their own jurisdiction, but rarely working in concert." Mary L. Schapiro,
Chairman & C.E.O. of the NASD, Remarks at the Investment Company
Institute General Membership Meeting (May 11, 2007), available at
http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/MaryL.Schapiro/PO19144.
176. See Judith Burns & Randall Smith, SEC Chairman Backs Creation of
One Regulator for Brokerages, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2006, at B3.
177. CCMR REPORT, infra note 179, at 67; see Markham, supra note 18, at
319-74 (discussing U.S. specifically focusing on securities and commodities,
futures markets, and modern problems facing the regulation of these markets,
as well as the conflicts between the SEC and CFTC over jurisdiction).
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and every combination thereof that can be conceived, but
also synthetic positions that can be based on nothing more
than abstract market perceptions at a given moment. To
add even more complexity, there are many and varied
institutions (banks, hedge funds, brokers, dealers, etc.)
participating in these markets. Recognizing this reality, the
question then evolves into how best to overlay the U.S.
regulatory framework over the current markets.
178
In November 2006, the Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation (CCMR) issued an Interim Report. 179 This
report was specifically addressed to the President of the
United States, in hopes that he will direct the President's
Working Group on Financial Markets to "implement
reforms to protect the competitiveness of the U.S. public
capital markets."1
80
The CCMR Report found that U.S. financial markets
are suffering from a loss of competitiveness due to:
178. See SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. AsS'N, REINVENTING SELF-REGULATION,
WHITE PAPER FOR THE SEC. INDUS. ASS'N (2000, updated Oct. 14, 2003)
http://www.sia.com/market-structure/html/siawhitepaperfinal.htm (discussing
securities regulation and offering six options for alternative regulatory models,
ranging from maintaining the status quo to forming a single governmental
regulatory organization); Jake Keaveny, Note, In Defense of Market Self-
Regulation, An Analysis of the History of Futures Regulation and the Trend
Toward Demutualization, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (2005) (arguing "that
the self-regulatory model, while in need of some type of reform, will survive the
latest round of scrutiny because time has shown that it is the most efficient and
practical alternative").
179. CoMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION INTERIM REPORT (Nov. 30,
2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30CommitteeInterim_
ReportREV2.pdf [hereinafter CCMR REPORT].
The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation is an independent,
bipartisan committee composed of 22 corporate and financial leaders
from the investor community, business, finance, law, accounting, and
academia. Announced on September 12, 2006, its purpose is to explore
a range of issues related to maintaining and improving the
competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets. Our objective is to
recommend policy changes that should be made, or areas of research
that should be pursued, to preserve and enhance the balance between
efficient and competitive capital markets and shareholder protection.
This interim report focuses on equity capital markets. During the next
two years, our Committee will continue to explore issues affecting other
aspects of the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets.
Id. at vii.
180. Id. at 1.
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(i) an increase in the integrity of and trust in major foreign public
markets resulting from more transparency and better disclosure;
(ii) a relative increase in the liquidity of foreign and private
markets, thus making it less necessary to go to the U.S. public
equity capital markets for funding; (iii) improvements in
technology, making it easier for U.S. investors to invest in foreign
markets; and (iv) differences in the legal rules governing the U.S.
public markets and the foreign and private alternatives. 18 1
These factors are all explored at length in the CCMR
Report; however, this Comment will limit its focus to those
recommendations concerning regulatory reform.18 2
The recommendations in the CCMR Report for
regulatory reform focus on four areas (1) improved
cost/benefit analysis of regulation; (2) a shift to more
principles-based form of rules; (3) adopting a more
prudential supervisory regime; and (4) greater domestic
181. Id. at 4-5. But see Paul S. Atkins, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Is
Excessive Regulation and Litigation Eroding U.S. Financial Competitiveness?
(Apr. 20, 2007), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch042007psa.htm
("The United States emerged from the end of World War II with its capital,
industrial and scientific structures intact. The rest of the industrialized world
lay in ruins. Communism and socialist ideas then suppressed the formation of
financial markets in many parts of the world. So for many decades, these
external factors made the United States the dominant financial marketplace in
the world. Regardless of our regulatory costs, there were no other financial
marketplaces with the size, liquidity, and depth of the United States-a
position that we have continued to maintain to this day .... With burgeoning
foreign capital centers and easy direct access of Americans to those markets,
foreign companies no longer have to come here.").
182. Other recommendations discussed in the CCMR REPORT deal with (1)
reforming public and private sector enforcement by allowing companies to adopt
limits to their exposure to class actions, reserving criminal prosecutions for
truly exceptional cases, reducing the present level of auditor liability,
recognizing the practical difficulties in the present requirements facing outside
directors acting in good faith reliance on prepared information, and allowing
greater indemnification of those outside directors acting in good faith; (2)
improving shareholder rights, especially in the areas of their right to vote on
takeover defenses and the adoption of alternative dispute resolution procedures;
and (3) revising implementation of section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
through greater clarity in defining "material weakness," better regulatory
guidance, and revised requirements for small companies and foreign companies.
See CCMR REPORT, supra note 179, at 12-21 (citing to executive summary, and
also discussing at greater length in sections III, IV, and V). It should also be
noted that the regulatory reforms of the CCMR REPORT are directed specifically
at securities regulation, but many of the recommendations could be applied to
the much broader issue of financial services market regulation as a whole (that
being the focus of this Comment).
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and international cooperation among regulators.183 A model
of regulatory framework frequently discussed in the report
is the United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority
(FSA), which is already premised on a principles-based
approach and has been hailed as an example of prudential
regulation.
The CCMR recommends that the SEC and self-
regulatory organizations (SROs) focus much more energy on
evaluating the costs and benefits associated with proposed
rules, and in reassessing the practicality of existing rules. 
18 4
The CCMR offers four possible ways to implement a greater
focus on cost/benefit analysis, ranging from legislative
enactment of such a requirement to voluntary adoption of
such analysis by the regulators. 8 5  By following a
cost/benefit approach to assessing regulation, regulators
would promote greater efficiency and reduce unnecessary
costs to the market.
The CCMR also suggests a shift to a more principles-
based form of regulation, which would involve reassessing
and reformulating the existing rules into a much simpler
set, or sets, of guiding principles based on the differing
needs of the market:
Sensible principles of good regulation, including efficiency,
economy, and proportionality, suggest that rules reflect the
differing needs for protection, both in types and amount, of various
investors whose knowledge, sophistication, and understanding
varies. Therefore, these same principles would dictate different, at
least in part, rulebooks for dealings with wholesale and retail
investors. No doubt, the proper application of a cost-benefit
183. Id. at 59.
184. Id. at 60-63.
185. Id. First, regulators, specifically the SEC, could submit proposed rules
and regulations to the Office of Management and Budget's Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs for an assessment of potential costs and benefits, and
this could become another input in the rule-writing process. The Office of
Management and Budget is an office in the executive branch, which performs
similar assessments for all significant executive agency actions (the SEC is an
"independent" agency not currently subject to such a review). Second, is the
creation of a separate agency to perform such cost/benefit analysis for SEC
proposals. Third, such analysis could be performed internally by creating a new
division within the SEC. Fourth, the SEC could incorporate such analysis into
its existing rule-writing processes.
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analysis would lead to the same conclusion.1 8 6
The CCMR also contends that the present "high-profile"
strategy of securities regulators, which focuses on
compliance with specific rules and broad publicity of
enforcement actions, is at odds with the reforms
contemplated in the report. 8 7 The CCMR recommends a
shift to a more open dialogue between the regulators and
the regulated, and a prudential approach that concentrates
on the "safety and soundness" of the financial system, more
in line with the approach of banking regulators. 88 This
approach would engender more willingness of the regulated
entities to bring their problems to the regulators rather
than hiding those problems from fear of public disciplinary
action. 189
A corollary to this issue is the CCMR's proposal that
regulators refrain from using enforcement action to
"refashion existing rules."190 This ad hoc approach to
rulemaking and enforcement "has the effect of engendering
greater uncertainty in the marketplace" and reducing the
willingness of regulated entities to communicate their
regulatory concerns to the regulating agencies.1 91
The final recommended course of action by the CCMR
Report is to increase cooperation and dialogue among
federal regulators, as well as between federal and state
regulators, to reduce the friction and "duplicate [ive]
structure that leads to both inconsistent rules and a waste
of resources."'192 This call for domestic coordination and the
recognition of the need for greater international regulatory
cooperation can best be achieved by the shift to a more
harmonized principles-based form of regulation rather than
trying to synchronize numerous extensive sets of
prescriptive rules. 93
186. Id. at 65.




191. Id. at 67.
192. Id. at 68.
193. Id. at 68-70.
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The recommendations made by the CCMR are all
interrelated: cost/benefit analysis would be a fundamental
precept in a shift to a more principles-based approach to
regulation, which in turn would stimulate a more
prudential regulatory approach leading to greater dialogue
between the regulators and regulated. A move to a more
principles-based regulatory approach would make it easier
to harmonize both domestic and international regulation.
Another recent report, the McKinsey Report, was
commissioned by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg
and U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (D., N.Y.) to evaluate
the competitiveness of U.S. financial services markets.
194
The McKinsey Report makes recommendations for broad
reform to the regulation of financial services industry in the
U.S., and does not restrict its discussion to the securities
markets (as did the CCMR Report).
The McKinsey Report makes eight recommendations to
increase the U.S.' competitiveness in the modern global
marketplace. 195 These recommendations consist of (1)
providing clearer guidance for implementing the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act; (2) implementing securities litigation reform; (3)
developing a shared vision for financial services and a set of
supporting regulatory principles; (4) easing restrictions
facing skilled professional workers (particularly
immigration policies); (5) recognizing the International
Financial Reporting Standards without reconciliation with
U.S. GAAP, and eventual convergence to a harmonized set
194. MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING N.Y.'s AND THE U.S.' GLOBAL FIN. SERVS.
LEADERSHIP (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/Schumer
Website/pressroom/special-reports/2007/NYREPORT%20_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter
MCKINSEY REPORT] ('Mayor Bloomberg and Senator Schumer asked McKinsey
& Company to work with the New York City Economic Development
Corporation (NYCEDC) to develop a better understanding of the contribution
that strong, innovative financial markets can make to a vibrant economy .... To
bring a fresh perspective to this topic, a McKinsey team personally interviewed
more than 50 financial services industry CEOs and business leaders. The team
also captured the views of more than 30 other leading financial services CEOs
through a survey and those of more than 275 additional global financial services
senior executives through a separate on-line survey."); see also Aaron Lucchetti,
Identity Crisis for New York?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2007, at C3 (discussing the
release of the MCKINSEY REPORT).
195. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 194, at 97-118. The MCKINSEY REPORT
also has a thorough discussion of U.S. competitiveness in today's markets
(Section II), and some specific suggestions for increasing New York's
competitiveness (Section IV (B)).
2008] 1421
1422 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
of accounting standards; (6) rethinking the U.S.
modifications to the Basel II Capital Accord; (7) forming a
National Commission on Financial Market Competitiveness
to guide the future of the U.S. financial markets; and (8)
modernizing the charters of the financial services industry
regulators, holding company models and operating
structures. 196
These recommendations echo many of the reforms
suggested by the CCMR Report, but also add some other
proposals such as relaxing the immigration restrictions for
skilled professional workers, rethinking the U.S.
modifications to the Basel II Capital Accords, 197 and
forming a National Commission on Financial Market
Competitiveness. This Comment will again focus on the
regulatory reforms discussed in the McKinsey Report.19
8
The McKinsey Report states that "London already
enjoys clear leadership in the fast-growing and innovative
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market."'199  The
McKinsey Report attributes this success in attracting
derivatives activity to London's overall regulatory
environment, which is perceived by business leaders to be
196. Id. at 95-118. These eight recommendations are divided into three
categories: critically important, near term national priorities ((1)-(3)); initiatives
to level the playing field ((4)-(6)); and important longer-term national issues
((7)-(8)). Id.
197. The efforts of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to revise
the standards governing the capital adequacy of internationally active banks
achieved a critical milestone in the publication of an agreed text in June 2004.
The Basel II Framework describes a more comprehensive measure and
minimum standard for capital adequacy that national supervisory authorities
are now working to implement through domestic rule-making and adoption
procedures. It seeks to improve on the existing rules by aligning regulatory
capital requirements more closely to the underlying risks that banks face. In
addition, the Basel II Framework is intended to promote a more forward-
looking approach to capital supervision, one that encourages banks to identify
the risks they may face, today and in the future, and to develop or improve their
ability to manage those risks. As a result, it is intended to be more flexible and
better able to evolve with advances in markets and risk management practices.
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL II, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm
(last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
198. Specifically "Section H (C) Competition intensifying in two key markets:
derivatives and debt and Section III (D) Recent US regulatory trends damaging
competitiveness" and the corresponding recommendations of the MCKINSEY
REPORT, supra note 194.
199. Id. at 54.
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superior to that in the U.S., and because the business
community feels that U.K. regulators are more responsive
and efficient. 200 The increasing pace of innovation and new
product development has put an increasing emphasis on
regulatory responsiveness and flexibility:
An increasingly heavy regulatory burden and a complex,
cumbersome regulatory structure with overlaps at the state and
national levels is causing an increasing number of businesses to
conduct more and more transactions outside the country. For
many executives, London has a better regulatory model: it is
easier to conduct business there, there is a more open dialogue
with practitioners, and the market benefits from high-level,
principles-based standards set by a single regulator for all
financial markets.
20 1
The McKinsey Report highlighted three themes to help
explain the growing differences between U.S. and U.K.
regulatory environments: "the regulatory structure, the
regulatory and supervisory approach and the regulatory
enforcement."20 2 The report discusses the fragmented, and
what has been characterized elsewhere as
"dysfunctional,' ' 203 structure of U.S. regulation of financial
markets, finding that it is perceived by many as
unresponsive, and consequently stifling of innovation. 20 4
The McKinsey Report also criticized the U.S. regulatory
approach, in contrast to the FSA principles-based approach,
as relying too much on rules and compliance, which ignores
the materiality of risk in favor of imposing legislatively
mandated regulations, many of which date back decades
and have failed to keep pace with the times;20 5 another
feature that could be avoided by a shift to a principles-
based system of regulation.
The McKinsey Report found that while the FSA was
perceived as open to discussing potential problems without
fear of reprisal, "[t]he multiple US regulators and enforcers,
200. Id. at 78.
201. Id. at 80.
202. Id. at 81.
203. CCMR REPORT, supra note 179, at 67.
204. See MOKINSEY REPORT, supra note 194, at 81-82.
205. Id. at 83-84.
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by contrast, play a different game entirely. ' 20 6 However, the
McKinsey Report does specifically mention and commend
the recent credit derivatives industry initiative as a positive
example of collaborative action to address and resolve
issues jointly. 20 7
Another intriguing recommendation of the McKinsey
Report was for a new commission to assess the long-term,
structural issues affecting the health, competitiveness, and
leadership of U.S. financial markets, the National
Commission on Financial Market Competitiveness. 208 This
Commission should evaluate the possibility of a single
regulator for all financial markets, which governed by a
principles-based regulatory framework, would have
superior flexibility and ability to deal with emerging issues
in the markets. 20
9
While the McKinsey Report stopped short of calling for
a wholesale replacement of the current rules-based
regulatory system with a principles-based approach, it did
recognize the need to develop a "clearly articulated vision,
strategy and mandate" to bring greater flexibility and
predictability to U.S. regulation.210 The shift in regulatory
approach should emphasize collaboration, dialogue between
regulators and market participants, and emphasis on
empirical effectiveness, all of which could be furthered
through implementing a common set of principles for the
regulation of all financial institutions in the U.S.211 The
Report also stated:
In a rapidly changing and increasingly global financial
marketplace, the private sector can provide information and
insights on market trends, customer needs, and market impact
that are valuable contributions to the decision-making process at
both the local and national levels. The [National Commission on
Financial Market Competitiveness] should therefore encourage
ways to enhance thoughtful private sector input to any policy or
regulatory decision as a means of helping to ensure better
206. Id. at 84.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 113-15.
209. Id. at 114.
210. Id. at 84.
211. Id. at 22.
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implementation and execution over time.
2 12
In March 2007, a third report was issued by a
bipartisan commission established by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce-the "Commission on the Regulation of U.S.
Capital Markets in the 21st Century. '213 This report
recognized that, "at least the perception, if not the reality,
of burdensome and duplicative regulatory schemes and an
inefficient and unfair legal system were making the U.S.
capital markets increasingly less attractive to foreign and
domestic companies alike. '' 214 It was against this backdrop
that the Commission undertook a reconsideration of the
"systems and institutions built over the past 70 years to
protect investors and foster capital formation. '2 15 The
Commission concluded with its most fundamental
recommendation, "that policy-makers and thought-leaders
address these problems now, before a crisis arises,"
216
because "[w]ith the rapid expansion of global capital pools
and the dramatic rise in new financial products over the
last decade, it has become increasingly clear that the
United States lacks an overall vision for how its legal and
regulatory framework should respond to these new market
developments": 217
The Findings of the Commission are unambiguous-the
competitive position of the U.S. capital markets is declining in the
212. Id. at 115. For a similar view on the benefits of private sector influence
in regulation, see William H. Donaldson & Harvey L. Pitt, Outdated and
Inefficient, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6-7, 2007, at A7 ("With the SROs and the industry
taking the lead, the need for a governmental solution is eliminated, and that's
always a preferable course.").
213. COMM. ON THE REG. OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, RPT.
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.capitalmarkets
commission.com/portal/capmarkets/default.htm (follow "Download the full
report" hyperlink) [hereinafter COMMERCE REPORT]; see also Kara Scannell,
Panel Urges Steps to Boost Allure of U.S. Markets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2007,
at Al (discussing the Commerce Report and the panels hosted by Treasury
Secretary Paulson to discuss and debate U.S. competitiveness); Panel
Commissioned by U.S. Chamber Urges Ways to Advance U.S. Capital Markets,
39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 413 (Mar. 19, 2007) (discussing the
COMMERCE REPORT and the conferences held by the Treasury department).
214. COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 213, at 1.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 12.
217. Id. at 11.
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context of heightened competition from international financial
centers and a U.S. legal and regulatory system whose basic
framework was established more than 70 years ago.
2 18
"The Commission started with the premise that its
recommendations needed to strike the right balance
between two statutory mandates: protecting investors and
promoting capital formation. ' 219 The challenges facing the
U.S. regulatory framework is striking the right balance
between these two goals, and ensuring flexibility in
regulation to adjust to inevitable fluctuations in the many
variables that affect the capital markets. 220 The Commerce
Report issued six formal recommendations that they
believed can and should be implemented by Congress, the
regulatory agencies, and the market participants within
2007.221
The Commission's recommendations were (1) reform
and modernize the federal government's regulatory
approach to financial markets and market participants; (2)
give the SEC the flexibility to address issues relating to the
implementation of SOX by making SOX part of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (3) convince public
companies to stop issuing earnings guidance or,
alternatively, move away from quarterly guidance with one
earnings per share (EPS) number to annual guidance with
a range of EPS numbers; (4) call on domestic and
international policy-makers to seriously consider proposals
218. Id. at 146.
219. Id. at 11.
Whenever . . . the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is
required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider,
in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) Pub. L. No.
104-290, 110 Stat. 3416, 3424-25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.). This language has been added to each of the three principal
securities statutes-the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and the Investment Company Act of 1940-demonstrating that the broader
objectives of efficiency, competition, and promotion of capital formation have
equal standing with the protection of investors. COMMERCE REPORT, supra note
213, at 120.
220. COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 213, at 17.
221. Id. at 6.
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by others to address the significant risks faced by the public
audit profession from catastrophic litigation, as well as the
Commission's suggestion that national audit firms be
allowed to raise capital from private shareholders other
than audit partners; (5) increase retirement savings plans
by connecting all employers of twenty-one or more
employees without any retirement plan to a financial
institution that will offer a retirement arrangement to
those employees; and (6) encourage employers to sponsor
retirement plans and enhance the portability of retirement
accounts through the introduction of a simpler, consolidated
401(k)-type program. 22
2
This Comment will focus on the first two of these
recommendations, dealing with regulatory reform. The
Commission recognized that "legal and regulatory
requirements in the United States relative to Europe and
Asia play an influential role in corporate decisions about
where to access capital markets. ' 223 The recommendations
advocated by the Commission with regard to regulatory
reform all reflect a change toward a more prudential and
flexible form of regulation that is more closely attuned to
the realities of converging markets rather than rooted in a
historic adherence to the distinct spheres of regulatory
authority that have developed in the U.S. "This
fragmentation of our regulatory system leaves the U.S.
markets open to the risk that gaps could develop where
appropriate regulation is needed or that overlaps in
regulation could lead to market inefficiencies. '224
The Commerce Report focused on the SEC for the
222. Id. at 6-10. The Commission recognized the important work and
findings by other groups, i.e., the CCMR REPORT and the MCKINSEY REPORT,
concerned with the challenges facing U.S. capital markets and specifically
limited its recommendations to reduce duplication in examination in some
areas. Id. at 12. However, it echoed the efforts to "reform America's litigation
system to reduce frivolous lawsuits." Id.
223. Id. at 21. However, the Commission also recognized that the lessened
competitiveness of U.S. capital markets was a combination of the fact that
European and Asian markets were developing as sound and secure markets,
which increasingly will attract more companies, and should be viewed as a
positive development; along with the regulatory requirements that have
increased the cost of raising capital in the U.S., a lack of convergence in
accounting systems between the U.S. and foreign markets, and the level of U.S.
civil litigation. Id. at 16-17.
224. Id. at 117.
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majority of its recommendations of regulatory reform. The
Commerce Report emphasized "properly tak[ing] into
account the costs and benefits of regulation and to be ever
cognizant of, and address, any unnecessary and duplicative
regulation. ' 225 The Commission emphasized the need for
more open communication between the SEC and the
institutions that it regulates, 226 as well as taking a more"prudential supervisory approach to regulation," as is used
by the FSA in the U. K. and U.S. banking regulators. 227 The
Commerce Report even cites the Major Dealers initiative in
the credit derivatives market as a prime example of such a
prudential approach. 228 In furtherance of this goal, the
Commission suggests that the SEC take three steps (1)
create an ongoing dialogue with the market participants to
consult and influence the development of appropriate
regulatory standards; (2) implement an "examination
privilege" to further open communication by market
participants; and (3) consider using resident examiners at
some of the largest SEC regulated institutions. 229
The Commerce Report highlights the flaw of having
separate regulators for securities and futures markets:
Unlike the United States, most of the rest of the world already
views all types of financial instruments as deserving a common
regulatory scheme. This approach not only appears preferable for
market users but it is also a much more efficient use of
government resources .... The Commission recognizes the wisdom
of having a single regulatory and supervisory framework for the
securities markets and the commodities markets.
230
The Commerce Report stops short of calling for a
merger of the SEC and CFTC and simply recommends a
regulatory realignment of the CFTC and SEC jurisdictions
because of the practical impediments to such a merger. 231
225. Id. at 121.
226. Id. at 128.
227. Id. at 129-30.
228. Id. at 131.
229. Id. at 131-33.
230. Id. at 139.
231. Id. at 139-40.
The Commission also is mindful of the historical underpinnings of the
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The Commission would have Congress transfer authority to
the SEC for securities and securities indexes.232 Other
regulatory reforms contained in the Commerce Report are:
increasing the flexibility and efficiency of regulation by
realigning the structure of the SEC to more closely mirror
the markets;23 3  adopting a policy of "substituted
regulation";234 issuing more informal guidance to regulated
institutions; 235  allowing the SEC more flexibility in
implementation, and giving the market more certainty in
interpretation, by making the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;236 and
increased cooperation and dialogue among all levels of
regulation (state and federal), coordinated through wider
participation in the President's Working Group on
bifurcated system in this country. And the Commission is cognizant of
the criticisms against simply merging the functions of the SEC and the
CFTC into a single agency. For example, agricultural groups, including
farmers and ranchers, which often use the commodities markets to
hedge their risk, fear that their interests will become secondary to the
interests of securities firms in a combined agency dominated by
securities issues.
Id. at 139.
232. Id. at 139-40 ("Commission recommends that Congress enact
legislation that transfers from the CFTC to the SEC sole regulatory and
supervisory authority over trading of futures on securities, including single
securities and securities indexes.").
Currently, these products are subject to a mix of SEC and CFTC
regulation. Consolidating regulatory responsibility for these products
will result in more streamlined regulatory oversight and will reduce
the cost of complying with multiple schemes. Under this
recommendation, the CFTC would retain jurisdiction over commodity
futures. The Commission cautions that the interests of the commodities
market participants must be preserved in order for this
recommendation to be successfully implemented.
Id. at 140.
233. COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 213, at 137-38.
234. Id. at 36-40. "Substituted compliance" would allow for foreign
institutions to be exempt from U.S. regulation if there was comparable home-
country regulation and bilateral information sharing between the U.S. and
foreign regulator, as well as reciprocal treatment for U.S. institutions in the
foreign country. Id. at 38.
235. Id. at 7. The Commission praises the SEC initiatives already in place
that attempt to give such guidance through no-action letters, frequently-asked-
questions (FAQs), and conferences. Id. at 131.
236. Id. at 7, 122-23.
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Financial Markets. 237
Contemporaneous with the release of the Commerce
Report, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and SEC
Chairman Christopher Cox co-chaired the Capital Markets
Competitiveness Conference. 238 This conference brought
together "[s]ome of the biggest names in government and
finance" to discuss the perception that U.S. competiveness
was waning. 239 While there was no consensus among the
panelists about the degree or reasons for this waning, Mr.
Paulson stated that "disagreement among the panelists was
'healthy because this is a complex issue as to what were the
most appropriate solutions.'
240
As a follow-up to this conference, Mr. Paulson
announced initiatives to enhance U.S. capital markets
competitiveness. These initiatives included "[p]ursuing a
modernized regulatory structure," whereby the Treasury
Department undertook an examination of the structure of
the regulatory system and promised to release a "blueprint
for reforms" in early 2008.241
237. Id. at 117-19.
238. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Opening
Remarks at Treasury's Capital Markets Competitiveness Conference (Mar. 13,
2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releaseshp306.htm. Mr. Paulson
stated:
Throughout the day, the fundamental question we must ask is: Have
we struck the right balance between investor protection and market
competitiveness-a balance that assures investors the system is sound
and trustworthy, and also gives companies the flexibility to compete,
innovate, and respond to changes in the global economy?
Id.
239. Deborah Solomon, A Summit on U.S. Rules: 'Too Gosh-Darn Complex,'
WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2007, at C4 (discussing the Capital Markets
Competitiveness Conference).
240. Id.
241. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Paulson Announces Next
Steps to Bolster U.S. Markets' Global Competitiveness (June 27, 2007),
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp476.htm (other initiatives
announced include Encouraging Development and Adoption of Industry Best
Practices for Asset Managers and Investors in Hedge Funds; Modernize
Treasury's Cash Management and Debt Management; Complete Basel II
Rulemaking; Empower All Investors through Financial Education; and
Encourage International Investment Opportunities with Recognition of
Comparable Regulatory Regimes). Paulson had released an earlier set of
initiatives all "focused on strengthened financial reporting and a more
sustainable and transparent auditing profession." Press Release, Henry M.
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Taken together, the CCMR Report, the McKinsey
Report, the Commerce Report, and Treasury Secretary
Paulson's efforts to address U.S. competitiveness, all
illustrate important themes in the recent evaluation of U.S.
regulation. Many are in favor of a shift toward a principles-
based approach. There is a wide consensus that regulators
should place greater emphasis and focus on cost/benefit
analysis to determine the practical efficiency of proposed
regulation. 242  There is recognition that markets are
changing, consolidating, and integrating across industries
that are currently compartmentalized by the U.S.
regulatory framework. The alternative model of U.S.
financial services regulation proposed in the next section of
this Comment will incorporate all of these ideals, around
the central tenet of transferring market control to the
collective control of the participants, as was done in the
Major Dealers initiative in the credit derivatives market.243
VI. A MODEL FOR FUTURE REGULATION?
There is widespread recognition that the U.S. needs to
take a long hard look at its current regulatory system and
decide how to make changes that will increase U.S.
competitiveness by reducing cost and redundancy, and
increasing flexibility and efficiency. Mr. Geithner recently
stated: "we need to take a careful look at how we regulate
Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Paulson Announces First Stage
of Capital Markets Action Plan (May 17, 2007), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp408.htm.
242. See CCMR REPORT, supra note 179, at 59-65; COMMERCE REPORT, supra
note 213, at 121; Robert K. Steel, Under Sec'y for Domestic Fin., U.S. Dep't of
the Treasury, Strengthening Our Capital Markets Competitiveness, Remarks
Before the Council on Competitiveness (May 17, 2007), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp409.htm (discussing the Treasury
Department initiatives, with special emphasis on the regulatory reforms,
including "Benefit-Burden Analysis").
243. While the OTC derivatives market is not itself subject to regulation,
the Major Dealers initiative is a poignant example of how market regulation
could be achieved as an efficient and flexible collaborative undertaking by the
actual market participants. There may be some resistance to efforts to make
these "unregulated markets" subject to the same sort of oversight and
cooperative action, but if this were part of an extensive revamp of the
regulatory approach to all markets, this author believes that it would be
successful; because, by giving up some modicum of freedom in OTC markets,
there would be a much greater overall benefit of increased participation in and
flexibility of rulemaking across all financial markets.
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financial activity in a world where capital is more mobile,
and the structure of the financial system has diverged
substantially from the system for which our regulatory
framework was designed."244
Under Secretary for Domestic Finance, Robert Steel,
has stated:
The current U.S. regulatory structure has been evolved over 150
years-with act on top of act, initiative on top of initiative-so that
today we have a series of individual regulations, each designed in
response to specific circumstances and lacking an overarching set
of guiding principles. ... If we were starting fresh and had a blank
page, no one would choose to draw a regulatory structure that
resembles our current picture. . . .We need a new, modernized
approach to regulation-one that is risk-based, globally oriented
and flexible in scope.
2 4 5
The progress made by the Major Dealers in the credit
derivatives markets is an example of how market
participants can come together and make a collective effort
to improve the very market upon which they all depend.
Their economic livelihood is inextricably intertwined with
the efficient operation of the markets in which they trade.
The actual market participants are the entities best
situated to come up with the most practical and efficient
solutions for the problems in the marketplace because they
are the ones who deal with those problems on a day-to-day
basis and they are the ones who will profit the most from an
increasingly efficient market. They will be motivated to
move quickly and have the first-hand knowledge necessary
to formulate and adapt regulation and market practices, to
ensure that regulation does not become a suffocating or
stifling force, but breeds innovation and encourages
ingenuity.
There has been widespread approval of the Major
Dealers initiative. One regulator stated that it could serve
as "sort of a model for regulators for collective action to
244. Timothy Geithner, Pres. & C.E.O. of Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Economic Dynamics of Global Integration, Remarks at the Forum on Global
Leadership: U.S. Competitiveness in a Globally Integrated Economy (July 25,
2007), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/
2007/gei070725.html.
245. Steel, supra note 242.
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address other problems that might arise. ' 246 The Major
Dealers initiative was also cited approvingly in the CCMR
Report, the McKinsey Report, and in the Commerce Report.
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Emil Henry, Jr.,
remarked that the developments in the credit derivatives
market were "proof of self-correcting free market capitalism
at its best."247 Gerald Corrigan (organizer of the CRMPG
initiative) stated that he was encouraged by the progress
made by the Major Dealers and that "[t]he model of private
and public sector cooperation and collective action is
functioning very well and is likely to have broader
applications. "248
However, former NY Fed President, Timothy Geithner
(who originally called for and hosted the meetings of the
Major Dealers), said "he believes that the credit derivatives
example is a special case-where the participants had an
overwhelming interest in making progress-rather than a
potential model. ' 249 This statement seems contrary to the
recent action by the NY Fed in meeting with senior
managers and compliance officers from twenty-two primary
dealers to discuss ways to strengthen the integrity of the
U.S. Treasury market by strengthening market practices,
"so as to maintain its status as the deepest and most liquid
sovereign debt market in the world. ' 250 As well as the NY
246. Corrigan Says Probability of Systemic Train Wreck Lower, 38 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 2005 (Dec. 4, 2006) (quoting SEC Comm'r Annette
Nazareth); see also David Wessel, How Would Hedge Funds Behave in a Crisis?,
WALL ST. J., July 20, 2006, at A2 (discussing the success of the Major Dealers
initiative in "cleaning up the back-office derivatives mess" as a model of how
government can play a role in regulation, "even without new rules"); Nazareth,
supra note 154 (approving of the Major Dealers initiative in speech).
247. Emil E. Henry, Jr., Asst. Sec'y of the Treasury, Hedge Funds and
Derivatives Markets: History, Issues and Current Initiatives, Remarks Before
the Fixed Income Forum (Mar. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.tres.gov/press/releases/js4111.htm (speaking about the multi-faceted
progress made in the credit derivatives market over the last year).
248. Banks Chart Significant Progress Toward Key Risk Managemet Goals,
38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep (BNA) No. 10, at 366 (Mar. 6, 2006) (quoting Corrigan,
and discussing the progress made in the credit derivatives markets, as well as
continuing challenges).
249. Corrigan Says Probability of Systemic Train Wreck Lower, supra note
246 (quoting Geithner).
250. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement Regarding New
York Fed Meeting with Primary Dealers (Nov. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/news/markets/2006/anO61105.html; see also
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Fed's instigation of an initiative in the equity derivatives
markets that is almost identical to the Major Dealers
initiative in the credit derivatives market.
251
Also, contrary to Mr. Geithner's assertion, it would
seem that participants in all markets would have an
"overwhelming interest in making progress" toward more
efficient regulation. 252 All participants are impaired by
inefficient regulation, which increases costs, wastes time
and constrains innovation. Such inefficiency cuts into
profits. Wouldn't participants in all markets share the
underlying motivation of wanting to increase the efficiency
of the regulations that dictate the extent of their freedom to
pursue profit?
A. The Model
The theoretical regulatory model253 advocated by this
New York Fed Meets with Dealers, Treasury Seeking Ways to Improve Integrity
of Market, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1899 (Nov. 13, 2006).
251. See supra note 137 (discussing the initiative in the equity derivatives
market).
252. See Corrigan Says Probability of Systemic Train Wreck Lower, supra
note 246, and text accompanying note 249. Also, if Mr. Geithner's remarks were
contemplating the fact that the Major Dealers had an increased motivation for
self-correcting the problems in the industry in order to remain free of external
regulation, such motivation would be inherent in all markets if they were given
the opportunity to self-regulate as in the model proposed in this Comment. In
fact, Mr. Geithner was also quoted as saying, "[w]e need to be able to move more
quickly than we have in the past; we need to be prepared to work with the
market and use the market to find sensible solutions-and we have to move to a
more integrated framework .... " Corrigan Says Probability of Systemic Train
Wreck Lower, supra note 246. These remarks coincide perfectly with the model
of regulation advocated in this Comment and lend even more support for using
the Major Dealers initiative as a model for future regulation.
253. This author is not naive enough to believe that such dramatic changes
to the U.S. regulatory structure will overcome the practical hurdles to become
reality; but the principles of consolidation of oversight and delegation of
rulemaking to market participants are ideals that should be furthered at every
given chance to increase the efficiency of regulation and thereby enhance U.S.
competitiveness. However, there has been recent discussion of merging
regulators with overlapping responsibilities. See Deborah Solomon, Paulson to
Launch Review of U.S. Regulatory System, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2007, at A6
(discussing possibility of merging two banking regulators: the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision).
At some point Congress will need to address these fundamental
jurisdictional and policy issues [between the CFTC and SEC]. And dare
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Comment is that of a single regulator which oversees all
financial markets, but delegates to those market
participants the authority to formulate the rules and
practices by which each market will operate. This is an
extension and adaptation of the SRO model relied upon by
the securities and commodities markets in which the
authority to develop specific rules to govern distinct
segments of the market is allocated to the exchanges,
thereby shifting some of the regulatory burden off of the
governmental agency and placing it on a group that has the
benefit of more direct participation in the market.
254
This Comment suggests taking the present SRO ideal,
and extending it even further. Place the responsibility for
designing best practices and industry standards in the
hands of those best suited and most plugged-in to the needs
of the markets: the actual market participants, not the
exchanges. 255
The government regulator would be an oversight and
enforcement body that guides all financial markets by a
simple, but comprehensive set of general principles that
each market would have to abide. 256 It would also be the
I note that the issues of potential SEC-CFTC consolidation pale in
comparison to the challenges, but also the potential cost savings and
efficiencies, that could result from consolidation of even a few of the
many federal banking regulators?
Annette L. Nazareth, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the
Council of Institutional Investors (Mar. 20, 2007), available at
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch032007aln.htm.
254. For a discussion of the development of the SRO regulatory model in the
securities and commodities and futures markets, see Markham, supra note 18,
at 325-56, and Keaveny, supra note 178, at 1423-38.
255. The market participants would have the most powerful motivation to
ensure efficient regulation: they would all benefit from eliminating redundancy;
they have the firsthand knowledge to formulate regulations that ensure
competitiveness; and their daily experience in the markets will allow them to
constantly assess and evaluate the current regulations, and make any
necessary changes.
256. It should be noted that there is potential for abuse by a single market
regulator, as recognized by Markham, supra note 18, at 405:
A single regulator may also seek to expand its powers after a scandal.
A single regulator will also undoubtedly use bad judgment in times of
crisis. A single regulator could also stifle competition, over-regulate,
and cause a loss of competitive position in international markets. It
could even try to... manage the economy by bureaucratic fiat (footnote
omitted).
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enforcement body of this model, ensuring compliance not
only with the general principles that it will promulgate, but
also with the more specific standards and rules adopted by
each market. It would provide guidance and coordination by
bringing to the attention of each market any problems or
issues that it recognizes. But, it would then delegate the
resolution of those issues to the actual market participants,
who would be free to adopt the most efficient solutions (as
long as those solutions are in accordance with the general
principles of the government regulator).257
This role of the government regulator coincides with
much of the recent discussions about moving toward a more
prudential form of regulation (for which the Major Dealers
initiative has been cited as a prime example 258). SEC
Commissioner Nazareth has described prudential
regulation as:
Professor Markham's point is well taken, and correct. Without competing
regulatory bodies, there is less of a check on the ability of a regulator to
overreach its authority. However, many of these concerns would be offset by the
use of the extended SRO model advocated in this Comment, which would dilute
the control of the government regulator to a role of guidance and enforcement.
Also, the government regulator would answer to Congress, and through
lobbying efforts, the financial services industries would be able to exercise a
modicum of control over abuse of power by the government regulator. It should
further be noted that Professor Markham did not come to the conclusion that a
single regulator would be not be the best approach, but rather stated that "a
unified regulator seems to be a sound idea," while recognizing both the
strengths and weaknesses inherent in such an approach. Id. at 410.
257. No regulatory structure can exist on principles alone. Markets need
and want a certain degree of rules to guide and give them assurance that they
are acting properly. For a discussion of the need for regulatory rules and the
"overblown" dichotomy between the U.S. rules-based approach and the U.K.
principles-based approach to regulation, see Roel C. Campos, Comm'r, Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, Principles v. Rules, Address Before Luxembourg Fund Industry
Association & American Chamber of Commerce (June 14, 2007) (showing the
need for rules in a regulatory structure, and pointing out that the FSA has an
8,000 page rulebook along with their eleven guiding principles); Robert C.
Pozen, Bernanke's False Dichotomy, WALL ST. J., May 19-20, 2007, at A8
(describing the false dichotomy between rules-based and principles-based
regulation). This Comment does not advocate market regulation based on
principles alone, but merely that oversight by the government regulatory body
be so based. Then, leave it to the market to develop the rules and practices
based on its fundamental desire for efficient and flexible requirements.
258. Annette L. Nazareth, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before
the SIFMA Compliance and Legal Conference (Mar. 26, 2007), available at
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch032607aln.htm.
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Prudential regulation to me implies having a clear set of standards
with a more flexible implementation approach for meeting those
standards. It means permitting regulated entities to meet their
obligations in a more customized, as opposed to "one-size-fits-all,"
manner. It means more efficient regulation, not less effective
regulation. 2 5
9
Although still a far cry from a single consolidated
government regulator, the U.S. regulatory agencies
apparently recognize the benefits of the consolidated
approach to regulation advocated by this Comment. The
efforts of the different agencies who sat in on the Major
Dealers' meetings are one example, as well as the collective
effort of the President's Working Group on Financial
Markets, "which consists of the Secretary of the Treasury
and Chairmen of the Federal Reserve, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, [and] has creatively examined
system-wide issues across the legalistic and jurisdictional
divides that normally separate one regulator's thinking
from another's. ' 260
There would be two ways to coordinate the
collaboration of market participants: first, through working
groups, committees, and conferences arranged by the
government regulator; or alternatively, through similar
efforts spearheaded by membership organizations. In the
first version, the government regulator would schedule
periodic conferences and meetings of market participants to
allow them to review existing rules and practices, and
create new ones to address issues within each market. This
would be directly based on the prototype of the Major
Dealers initiative in the credit derivatives market. In the
second version, market participants could act collectively
through a membership organization, such as the ISDA in
the OTC derivatives market, or FINRA, the new single-SRO
for the securities industry created from the merger of the
259. Id. Commissioner Nazareth also recognizes that the SEC has made
steps in this direction through its Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE)
Program, and that such an approach to regulation has limitations, i.e., it may
not be the best approach for regulating retail sales practices.
260. Recommendations by the President's Working Group on Financial
Markets: Hearing Before the Commission on Banking and Financial Services,
106th Cong. 84 (Apr. 11, 2000) (statement by Hon. James A. Leach, Chairman,
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services).
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NASD and NYSE regulatory branch, to address those same
issues. 261 This second version is more of an extension of the
SRO model now used in the securities and futures
markets. 262 But, rather than have the SRO be a rulemaking
and oversight entity for an exchange or discrete group, it
could perform that same function for the entire market. The
rules created by it would be the only rules for the market,
not an added layer on top of an already complex system of
rules and regulations promulgated by the government
regulator. It could be comprised of members that were each
affiliated with a market participant, but permanently
assigned to be the voice of that institution in the
cooperative rulemaking and oversight body for the market.
In both versions, the market participants would
collaborate to solve issues in their market by establishing
the practices and rules by which they would all be bound.
These would be the only rules that governed the market,
thereby eliminating the redundancy of multiple layers of
regulation which exists today. The government regulator
would oversee the practices and rules in each market to
ensure conformity to the government regulator's principles,
and compliance by all market participants. The more
frequent the meetings of the market participants, the
greater flexibility and responsiveness of regulation would
261. See News Release, NASD, NASD Member Firms Embrace Streamlined,
More Efficient Regulation (Jan. 21, 2007), available at
http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2007NewsReleases/NASDW_01
8334 (discussing the merger between the two regulatory organizations into a
single SRO which "create[d] a single regulator for the country's nearly 5,100
broker-dealers, eliminating overlapping regulation and reducing costs to the
industry").
262. By placing the responsibility for regulating each market in the hands of
the market participants through working groups organized by the
governmental regulator or through non-profit membership organizations
adaptation of the current SRO model, another controversy would be settled, i.e.,
the unrest caused by the demutualization of many exchanges. Many feel that by
making exchanges a for profit enterprise, there will be increased incentive for
those exchanges to become lax in their regulatory capacity and even inherent
conflict between the pursuit of profit and the "separate" regulatory function of
ensuring compliance by its members. For a discussion of the demutualization
concerns, see Caroline Bradley, Demutualization of Financial Exchanges:
Business as Usual?, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 657 (2001); Keaveny, supra note
178, at 1438-50; see also Aaron Lucchetti, Alistair MacDonald & Kara Scannell,
NYSE, Euronext Set Plan to Form a Markets Giant-Landmark $20 Billion
Deal by U.S., Europe Exchanges Face Oversight Questions, WALL ST. J., June 2,
2006, at Al.
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be to actual market conditions.
The recent merger of the NASD-NYSE into a single
self-regulatory organization, the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA), is a significant step toward
the consolidation and increased efficiency that is essential
to U.S. regulatory reform. 263 This merger has been praised
and approved as a plan to eliminate complexity and
confusion, as well as consolidating the expertise of market
regulators.264 The benefits of the merger will be increased
efficiency, reduced redundancy, and reduced cost, but this
approach will still be applying externally created rules and
regulation on the market.265 This merger also fits nicely
263. See Randall Smith, NASD Approves Tie-up With NYSE on Oversight,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2007, at C5; News Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE
Member Regulation Combine to Form Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority-FINRA (July 30, 2007), available at
http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2007NewsReleases/P036329.
264. Donaldson & Pitt, supra note 212, at A7 (both authors are former
chairmen of the SEC) (criticizing the current state of securities regulation as
"redundant and inefficient and in that context doesn't benefit either investors or
the industry," and calling the merger "the first significant change in the self-
regulatory regime in this country in more than 70 years"); see Christopher Cox,
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, More Efficient and Effective Regulation in the
Era of Global Consolidation of Markets, Remarks to the Securities Industry &
Financial Markets Association (Nov. 10, 2006), available at
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spchlllOO6cc.htm ("As Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, I strongly support these efforts, which
are currently well underway, to fold the member regulation functions of both
the NASD and the NYSE into one regulatory body. I'm firmly convinced that,
done properly, this can make our self regulatory system more efficient and more
robust from an investor protection standpoint."). It should be noted that not all
of the comments regarding the merger have been positive. Most of the criticism
focused on the perceived decrease in investor protection, subjugation of smaller
market participant interests and increased industry influence as opposed to
investor protection. See William F. Galvin, Sec'y of the Commonwealth. of Mass.
(Boston), Letter to the Editor, Multiple Regulators Vital to U.S. Securities
Markets, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2006, at A19 ("If NYSE regulation is merged into
the NASD, there will be one less decision maker evaluating the conduct of
market participants."); see also Randall Smith, NASD's Chief Fights for United
Regulators, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2006, at C1 (presenting a brief balanced
review of the issues that faced the merger).
265. The market participants would have somewhat of a voice in the rules
and practice promulgated by the single regulator, with ten of the twenty-three
seats on the board of directors reserved for industry representation. Smith,
supra note 264, at C1. Having a minority representation on the board of
directors is a far cry from the direct industry initiative of designing the rules for
the markets in which they operate, as advocated by this Comment and
exemplified in the Major Dealers initiative in the credit derivatives market.
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into the proposed framework for a new regulatory model
proposed in this Comment as a preliminary step in moving
toward a more consolidated regulatory environment, but
falls short of placing the control of the market in the hands
of the actual participants.
The market participants would always be motivated to
approach regulation from a cost/benefit approach, thereby
ensuring efficiency and hopefully fostering an environment
where innovation and adaptation would be nurtured and
encouraged through firsthand experience in determining
the effectiveness of regulation. The ideals of investor
protection and market integrity should not be discarded or
ignored, but merely applied in the most effective manner to
allow the U.S. markets to remain competitive.
B. Potential Concerns
The model of regulation proposed in this Comment does
raise some potential concerns, such as the opportunity for
collusion; the possibility of exclusion and subrogation of the
interests of smaller participants; lessened investor
protection; as well as a host of practical implementation
impediments. This Comment will address and offer
responses to curb some of the disquiet concerning the first
three of these issues, but fully recognizes the practical
concerns and impediments confronting a model of
regulation calling for an extensive revamp of the entire U.S.
system of regulation. Such obstacles are the purview of
policymakers and lobbyists, and deal with issues well
beyond the abilities of this author to overcome. 266 However,
barriers which focus not on the merits of such change, but
266. However, with the recent budgetary concerns within the CFTC, and
the fact that the CFTC has not been reauthorized-the CEA expired in 2005-
as well as the recent discussions of merging of certain banking regulators and of
the SEC and CFTC (discussed supra note 253), it would seem that the time may
be ripe for serious contemplation of moving toward a unified regulatory system.
See Hatfield Laments Budget, Staffing, But Sees Hope in SEC Ties as Realms
Converge, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 2011 (Dec. 4, 2006)
(discussing the CFTC Comm'r Hatfield's concerns over the underfunding of the
CFTC and his optimism that the "CFTC and SEC can forge a closer alliance as
the worlds of equity and derivatives trading become more closely aligned," and
his proposed "formal structure to link the regulators"); CFTC Reauthorization
Back, but Issue Faces Crowded Calendar for Attention, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 3, at 99 (Jan. 22, 2007) (discussing the CFTC's concerns, primarily
its underfunding and Congress's failure to reauthorize the CEA since 2005).
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on the bureaucratic difficulties of implementation should
not dictate the course of progress.
Some people might argue that placing the regulation of
financial markets in the hands of the actual market
participants would be like letting the foxes guard the
henhouse. While there is always potential for abuse by
some in any system of regulation, this author does not
believe that the proposed model of collective control by the
market would inherently engender collusion or abuse. In a
collaborative regulatory environment, individual economic
concerns would cause the group to deny any individual a
competitive advantage. The market participants acting as a
group would operate as a natural check and balance on any
individual attempt to manipulate the system to its own
advantage. Further, all regulation would be monitored by
the government regulator to assure compliance with
general principles, which would have an intrinsic "policing
effect" on any widespread collusion. The market
participants would be given the opportunity to create the
most efficient and adaptable regulatory environment, but
that regulation would still have to conform to the ideals of
integrity, transparency, and fairness as mandated by the
overseeing government regulator.
The concerns over lessened investor protection are
answerable in the same vein. The government regulator
would not be abandoning its role of ensuring integrity and
investor protection. This Comment does not purport to
lessen or change such ideals, just to allow the
implementation of such principles to be decided in the most
efficient manner, to ensure the competitiveness of U.S.
markets.
Concern over exclusion and subjugation of smaller
market participant interests could be addressed by
mandatory representation of smaller interests in any policy
making committee. A "one firm, one vote" policy would
ensure that all market participants would have an equal
voice in determining market practices and standards.
267
267. See Smith, supra note 264, at C1 (describing a similar approach used
by the NASD as one reason for opposition to the NASD-NYSE merger: "[NASD]
dissidents are worried they will lose their voice because it will end the NASD's
current 'one firm, one vote' policy, which favors small firms"). Such a policy
carries with it the reciprocal concern of excluding the interests of the larger
firms by diluting their influence in the collaborative process with copious
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Policies would have to be enacted either at the level of the
government regulator's principles or at the membership
organization level to strike the right balance between the
representation of interests of small and large players.
CONCLUSION
The regulatory model advocated in this Comment
envisions markets that are regulated by collective action of
market participants through either groups organized by a
government regulator or through membership
organizations, all of which is overseen by a single
government regulator that guides the markets (through
open dialogue and a set of simple principles) and ensures
compliance through enforcement of not only its core
principles, but also with the rules promulgated by the
individual markets.
The example of the Major Dealers initiative in the
credit derivatives markets is an archetype for collective
action by market participants under the guidance of
regulators who allow self-correction of industry-wide
problems and self-determination of best practices by those
best situated and motivated to deal with those issues.
Further, the single government regulator approach of this
model finds support in the collaborative efforts of the
regulators who take part in the President's Working Group
on Financial Markets, which recognizes the need to
approach issues from a consolidated rather than
fragmented vantage, as well as recent reports that call for
reform and consolidation of the U.S. regulatory structure.
Together, these two components will further the efficiency
of market regulation and U.S. competitiveness, which
should be two of the goals for any future model of U.S.
regulation that is adopted.
representation of smaller firms.
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